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MAJOR LITIGATION ACTIVITIES
REGARDING MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES: THE
FAILURE OF THE "DISABILITY" DEFINITION
IN THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

OF 1990
LISA EIcHHoRN*

The passage of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct ("ADA") in
1990 has been praised as the major accomplishment of the
disability rights movement. This statute,however,is not without its
flaws. Perhaps the most problematic one is the way in which
"disability" is defined. Lisa Eichhorn argues that the definition
undercuts the effectiveness of the ADA. She begins with a
historicallook at society's concepts of disabilityand discusses how
these concepts were incorporated into the RehabilitationAct of
1973 and the ADA. She then examines cases that have been
dismissed because plaintiffs cannot prove disabled status, which
illustratethe problems with the disability definition. The Supreme
Court has not provided lower courts with much guidance in this
area, as demonstrated by the recent case of Bragdon v. Abbott.
Ms. Eichhorn,however, offers relief for courts struggling with the
definition: amend the disability definition so it represents more
accurately the goals not only of the Act's drafters but also of
disability rights activists.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1990, while signing the Americans with Disabilities Act'
("ADA") into law, President Bush announced that the new
legislation represented "the full flowering of our democratic
principles" and promised "to open up all aspects of American life to
individuals with disabilities."2 By prohibiting discrimination based
upon disability,3 the ADA indeed showed signs of enabling millions
of Americans with disabilities to participate more fully in society. By
1996, however, courts applying the language of the ADA had
summarily dismissed numerous cases of alleged disability
discrimination on the ground that the plaintiffs were not disabled,
even though the plaintiffs bringing these cases suffered from
disorders as severe as cancer4 and hemophilia.' In June 1998 in
Bragdon v. Abbott,6 a plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV won the right
to have a federal court consider the merits of her claim of disability
discrimination by her dentist. That victory, however, came only after
the U.S. Supreme Court conducted a philosophical inquiry into the
significance of reproduction to human existence in order to7
determine if the plaintiff was disabled for purposes of the ADA.
The plaintiff in Bragdon was lucky. A recent survey conducted by
the American Bar Association found that a significant percentage of
ADA discrimination claims are dismissed on summary judgment
because plaintiffs cannot prove the prima facie elements, which
include disabled status.' The survey also revealed that in cases in
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For a helpful overview of the ADA's provisions,
see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination,109 HARV. L. REV. 1568,

1604-13 (1996).
2. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,2 PUB. PAPERS

1070 (July 26, 1990).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (prohibiting disability-based discrimination
with respect to employment, public services, and public accommodations, respectively).
4. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a plaintiff with breast cancer did not have a disability).
5. See, e.g., Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the plaintiff, who was rejected from a firefighting job because of his hemophilia, was
not disabled), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
6. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
7. See idL at 2204-05.
8. See Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative
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which one party clearly prevailed, 92% of judicial decisions favored
defendants. 9
Although the ADA has been hailed as the chief accomplishment
of a civil rights movement on behalf of people with disabilities, the
way in which "disability" is defined in the statute has undercut its
effectiveness as a guarantor of civil rights. This Article analyzes the
harmful effect that the definition has on litigation involving disability
discrimination and calls for change. Part II traces new concepts of
disability that have emerged through the disability rights movement
in the past several decades and discusses how these concepts became
incorporated into two landmark federal statutes: the Rehabilitation
Act of 197310 and the ADA. Part III documents the ways in which
the specific wording of the ADA's definition of "disability,"
borrowed from the earlier Rehabilitation Act, has undercut the
statute's goal of fostering greater participation in society on the part
of people with disabilities. The problematic language in the
definition fails to reflect the congressional intent to cover people with
a broad range of physical and mental impairments, and it actually
cuts against several of the theoretical underpinnings of the disability
rights movement. Most significantly, the statutory language has
caused courts to dismiss legitimate lawsuits when plaintiffs cannot
prove their disabled status under the poorly drafted definition.
Although the Supreme Court recently examined the definition, its
opinion in Bragdon provides little or no guidance for future cases
because the essentially meaningless statutory language does not allow
the Court to articulate firm principles of interpretation. Finally, Part
IV responds to these identified weaknesses by suggesting
amendments to the ADA's definition of disability that will allow the
definition to reflect more accurately the principal goal of the ADA's
drafters and of the disability rights movement:
to prevent
discrimination on the basis of disability.
Complaints, 22 Mental & Phys. Disability L. Rep. (ABA Comm'n on the Mentally
Disabled) 403, 403-05 (May-June 1998) [hereinafter Employers Win] (compiling figures
indicating that of the 760 ADA cases between 1992 and 1998 resulting in a decision for one
party or the other, 232 were decided in favor of the defendant on summary judgment). In
addition to disabled status, a plaintiff must also prove as a prima facie matter that he or
she is qualified for the job at issue and that he or she suffered an adverse action because of
the disability. See, e.g., Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (stating the elements of ADA plaintiff's prima facie case); Nesser v.
TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Barnett v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 56
(1st Cir. 1998) (same).
9. See Employers Win, supranote 8, at 404.

10. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-7961 (West 1999).
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II. COMING TOGETHER: How THE ADA EMERGED AS THE
PRODUCT OF A DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The ADA states that "the Nation's proper goals regarding

individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
such individuals."" To meet these goals, the statute includes among
its purposes "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities' 1 2 and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing [this type of] discrimination."' 3 These goals and
purposes derive from a historic disability rights movement, which was
largely responsible for incorporating them into our national civil
rights policy.' 4 Therefore, any assessment of how the ADA has
allowed the United States to meet these goals must begin with an
understanding of the goals themselves in the context of the disability

rights movement.
A.

People with DisabilitiesDefining Themselves

While activists urged society to grant rights to the disabled as
early as the nineteenth century, 5 the most noted historian of the
modem disability rights movement traces its origins to the late 1960s
and early 1970s.' 6 The hallmark of the modem movement is the
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially
Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and
Misconstruction of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 513-16 (1997)
(tracing the goal of full participation to the writings of disability activist Jacobus S.
tenBroek).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
13. Id § 12101(b)(2).
14. See, e.g., FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1997) (providing
an encyclopedic treatment of significant events, persons, and organizations in the
movement); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993) (providing a comprehensive history of the disability
rights movement).
15. Dorothea Dix, for example, pushed for reform of public almshouses in which
many disabled people were warehoused in the early 1800s. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at
59-60; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 19 (1983); see also PELKA, supra note 14, at 106-08 (describing the
career of Dorothea Dix).
16. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 41-73. Another chronicle of the disability rights
movement that emphasizes current issues facing disability activists in the United States
and abroad is found in JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABoUT US WITHOUT Us:
DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT (1998).
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refusal of disabled people to be marginalized-that is, to be viewed

as "the Other"- 7-in a society dominated by non-disabled people.
Indeed, in the modem movement, disabled people have chosen to
define themselves rather than to accept societal dictates regarding
who they, as disabled people, should be. Underlying this rejection of
societal labels is the recognition that disability itself is socially
constructed."8 In other words, society's categorization of some
people as "disabled" and others as "non-disabled" is entirely
arbitrary; it depends upon relative notions regarding the activities
that human beings should be able to perform and how they should be
able to perform them.1 9 Thus, the notion that there is something
wrong or abnormal about people with disabilities is equally
arbitrary.2" Along these lines, one theoretician of disability issues
sees his goal as helping" 'normal' people to see the quotation marks
21
around their assumed state.

17. See Myron G. Eisenberg, Disabilityas Stigma, in DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECONDCLASS CITIZENS 3, 3 (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter DISABLED
PEOPLE] (analyzing the position of disabled citizens as "Others" in society and drawing on
notions of "the Other" from JERzY KOSINSKI, THE PAINTED BIRD (1965)).
18. For excellent theoretical discussions of the relativity of disability, see LENNARD J.
DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY 1-22 (1995),
and CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITz, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCr: LEGISLATIVE
ROOTS (1988).
19. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 90 ("Concepts of normality
and abnormality and of ability and disability have no real meaning unless they are
considered in the context of the nature and purpose of a particular task or activity."); see
also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Who Are "Handicapped"Persons?, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 11, 11 (Robert L. Burgdorf,
Jr. ed., 1980) ("[C]ertain traits have been singled out and called handicaps. The fine line
between handicapped and normal has been arbitrarily drawn by the 'normal' majority."
(footnote omitted)). Consistent with this notion of relativity, Nancy Eiesland, a theorist
of religion and disability, points out that "people with disabilities are distinguished not
because of our shared physical, psychological, or emotional traits, but because
'temporarily able-bodied' persons single us out for differential treatment." NANCY L.
EIESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY
24 (1994); see also SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 12
(1998) ("When disability is redefined as a social/political category, people with a variety of
conditions are identified as people with disabilities or disabled people, a group bound by
common social and political experience.").
20. Writer Carol Gill has noted that in an ideal world, "[b]eing unable to do
something the way most people do it would not be seen as something bad that needed
curing. It would be seen as just a difference." Carol J. Gill, Questioning Continuum, in
THE RAGGED EDGE 42, 45 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994). This ideal state, or something close
to it, may actually have existed not so long ago. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at 23-30
(tracing the valuing of "normal" or "average" status to the rise of statistical analysis in the
late eighteenth century, before which time all human bodies were judged as equally short
of some unattainable ideal).
21. DAVIS, supra note 18, at xii.
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A good illustration of this aspect of disability theory is the Deaf

Culture movement.' This movement consists of people in the deaf
community "who reject the idea that an inability to hear constitutes a
disability, maintaining instead that they are members of an ethnic

and linguistic minority"'

who communicate primarily through

American Sign Language ("ASL"). Because many deaf people have

no problem communicating with each other and have in fact
developed an ASL literature and theater, they see deafness as a

positive cultural identity rather than a handicapping condition. 24
According to proponents of Deaf Culture, outsiders who see deafness
simply as the lack of hearing are looking at the world through an
"ableist"5 or "audist" 26 perspective.
Similarly, scholars in the disability studies movement have noted

that any classification of people into "disabled" and "non-disabled"
categories must come from a prejudiced perspective because all
human abilities can be placed on a continuum, thus making blackand-white categorization impossible. 27 Those who wish to draw
22. For more information regarding the Deaf Culture movement, see HARLAN LANE,
THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF COMMUNITY 13-28 (1992);
PELKA, supra note 14, at 88-89; SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 75-104. See generally
DOUGLAS C. BAYNTON, FORBIDDEN SIGNS: AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST SIGN LANGUAGE (1996) (exploring deafness in the context of cultural history).
23. PELKA, supra note 14, at 88; see also DAVIS, supra note 18, at xii ("[M]any in the
Deaf community will argue that deafness is not a disability."). But see BONNIE POITRAS
TUCKER, THE FEEL OF SILENCE at xxi-xxii (1995) ("I am viewed as a traitor to my
heritage because I would gladly grab any opportunity to fix my deafness. Deaf people lack
one of the five critical senses, plain and simple. That lack is something to be repaired, to
the extent that reparation is possible.").
24. See PELKA, supra note 14, at 88. For an insightful chronicle of the development of
a common culture among students at a school for the deaf in New York City, see LEAH
HAGER COHEN, TRAIN Go SORRY: INSIDE A DEAF WORLD (1994).
25. See PELKA, supra note 14, at 3 (defining "ableism" as a "set of often contradictory
stereotypes about people with disabilities that acts as a barrier to keep them from
achieving their full potential as equal citizens in society"); see also LINTON, supra note 19,
at 9 (defining "ableism" as including "the idea that a person's abilities or characteristics
are determined by disability or that people with disabilities as a group are inferior to
nondisabled people").
26. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at xiv (using the term "audist" to describe a prejudice
that favors hearing people and disfavors or ignores deaf people); LANE, supra note 22, at
43 (defining the term "audism" as "the paternalistic, hearing-centered endeavor that
professes to serve deaf people"); PELKA, supra note 14, at 33 (defining "audism" as "the
belief that life without hearing is futile and miserable, that hearing loss is a tragedy and
'the scourge of mankind,' and that deaf people should struggle to be as much like hearing
people as possible").
27. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at xv; see also Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 519-22
(discussing the spectrum of human abilities). But see Gill, supra note 20, at 42-43
(criticizing the notion of a continuum or spectrum because it downplays the important,
valuable consequences of individual differences among people). For an excellent defense
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lines-to reify disability -are simply trying to ensure their own
place on the correct, "normal" side.2 9 They can then assume that
those on the other side are somehow lesser humans, whose primary
need in life is a cure that will allow them to join the ranks of the
normal. In the last two decades, leaders in the disability rights
movement have recognized that a transition to normalcy cannot be a
valid goal because normalcy-like disability-is merely a relative
concept.30 While society may try to enforce its notion of normalcy by
urging disabled people to go to painful or damaging lengths to
resemble their non-disabled counterparts,31 the appearance of
normalcy is not nearly as important as the right to participate fully in
society.
Further, in addition to rejecting the labels and categories that
society historically has assigned to disabled people, members of the
disability rights movement have invented and reinvented terminology
to define themselves.32 As in other civil rights movements, activists
of the disability studies movement, see LINTON, supra note 19, at 117-31.
28. See LIACHOWITz, supra note 18, at 3 (analyzing Robert A. Scott's discussion of
the reification of mental retardation in ROBERTA. ScoTr, THE MAKING OF BLIND MEN:
A STUDY OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION 14 (1969)).
29. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 5 ("The disabled ...serve a useful function in
society, making 'normal' persons feel healthier, brighter, more competent, and secure.").
30. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at 24 ("[T]he problem is not the person with disabilities;
the problem is the way that normalcy is constructed to create the 'problem' of the disabled
person."); see also LIACHOWrrZ, supra note 18, at 2-3 (discussing the relativity of
deviance, including physical deviation).
31. Disability activist Nancy Eiesland recounts the story of Diane DeVries, who wore
upper and lower prosthetic devices during her childhood at the urging of doctors, to
"normalize" her functioning. See EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 37. After trying 12 pairs of
arms, DeVries abandoned them, finding them "'more of a hassle than a help.'" Id.
(quoting an interview with Diane DeVries). Indeed, because she could eat, drink, and
play much better without the arms, "DeVries felt more disabled and less independent with
the devices than without them." Id.
Similarly, Joseph Shapiro reports that in the 1950s, society rewarded people with
polio who rejected wheelchairs and built up their muscles so that they could walk like nondisabled people (albeit with braces and crutches). See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 15-16.
Doctors at that time had recommended crutches over wheelchairs not because they had
evidence that walking was physically more beneficial, but simply because "sociologically it
was expected." Id. at 16. Ironically, decades later, those who built the most muscle found
that their muscles atrophied the fastest. See id.
Cynthia Griggins, a rehabilitation specialist, has noted societal attitudes consistent
with these anecdotes: "Somehow, a quadriplegic who is working and learning to dress
himself (even though it may take him half a day) is more palatable than a quadriplegic
who is doing nothing. It's bad enough that they can't contribute to society-at least they
can look busy!" Cynthia Griggins, The Disabled Face a Schizophrenic Society, in
DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 17, at 30,37.
32. See EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 25 ("As linguists and anthropologists know, the
act of naming someone or something grants the namer power over the named.
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have sought to reclaim pejorative terms and invest them with new,
positive meaning. Thus, the word "crippled" has come into vogue
among some disability activists.3 3 The conversion of this term from
an offensive slur to a rallying cry demonstrates the growth of pride
and group identity among some disabled people. However, the more
acceptable term by far today is "disabled," which has replaced the
word "handicapped," a term that had been used for decades to
describe people with mental and physical impairments.' In addition,

most members of the movement prefer "people with disabilities" to
"the disabled," because the former term emphasizes the person
rather than the impairment.3 5
Along with new notions of the idea of disability has come a new
sense of community among disabled people. In the last two or three
decades, a culture of disability has developed in this country, marked
by the appearance of Disability Pride events, as well as writings and
theater by, for, and about people with disabilities. 6 Organizations
have formed to unite people with different types of disabilities and to
foster more effective advocacy.37 Indeed, disability activists have
come to think of themselves as members of a minority group,3 8 and a
Historically, rather than naming ourselves, the disabled have been named by ... people
who denied our full personhood."); see also Leonard Kriegel, The Cripple as American
Male, in DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 17, at 52, 55 ("[W]hen the cripple looks around
himself, he discovers that he is defined from the outside.").
33. See Kriegel, supra note 32, at 52 ("I am... an individual who has lived 35 of his 46
years here on earth as a cripple, a word which I prefer to either handicappedor disabled,
each of which seems to me a euphemism for the realities facing us."); see also EIESLAND,
supranote 19, at 26 (discussing the recent use of the word "cripple"); SHAPIRO, supra note
14, at 34 (same).
34. One commentator has noted that the term "handicap" carries with it the idea of
unequal contestants in a competition, while "disability" conveys a more general sense of
limitation. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at xiii; see also EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 27
(noting that "disability" denotes an inability to perform a task and that "handicap"
denotes the social disadvantage resulting from the disability); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 5 (comparing the terms "handicap" and "disability").
35. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 33.
36. For a brief description of the development of disability culture, see PELKA, supra
note 14, at 97-98, and SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 99-104. For a discussion about the
importance of the development of a disability culture, see KENNY FRIES, STARING BACK:
THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 1, 9-10 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997).
37. For a brief discussion of early disability advocacy groups, see PELKA, supra note
14, at 81-82; and RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 36-37 (1984).
38. See EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 62 ("The minority-group model holds that the
physical and psychological restrictions that people with disabilities face are primarily due
to prejudice and social discrimination .... Hence the locus of the problem of disability
... is the system of social relations and institutions that has ... [marginalized] ... people
with disabilities as a group."). Lennard Davis notes that "the term 'physical minorities'
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rather large one at that.3 9

Thus, from the disability fights movement, two paradoxical ideas
emerge concerning disability and identity. On the one hand,
disability is an unstable term; it is a relative category, artificially
constructed by a society to enforce the normalcy of the majority of its
members." On the other hand, disability is a valid, unifying identity
that reflects the real experiences and culture of a large group of
people in this same society.4" This paradox no doubt accounts for
much of the confusion surrounding the attempts of the ADA4 and its
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 43 to define "disability"
for legal purposes.
B. People with DisabilitiesDefining Discrimination
The disability rights movement's exposure of disability as a
socially-constructed phenomenon logically has led to a new
understanding of discrimination on the basis of disability.
Specifically, the disadvantaged social and economic status of many
disabled people" has resulted not from their disabilities themselves which are merely artificial constructs-but rather from societal
discrimination against those viewed as disabled. 45 Indeed, by viewing
disabled people as "others," society has constructed a world tailored

to the needs of people without physical or mental impairments.
Because this world ignores the needs of the rest of the population,
disabled people are less able to function in it. Disability theorists

realize that this construction of the world is not inevitable and that its
gives more of a political sense to physical difference than the more abstract category
'disabled.'" DAVIS, supra note 18, at 3; see also John S. Hicks, Should Every Bus Kneel?,
in DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 17, at 13, 26-29 (comparing people with disabilities to
ethnic minorities and suggesting that both groups could preserve their identities if society
adopts a model of cultural pluralism). The ADA itself notes that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority" in the American population. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(7) (1994).
39. The ADA, in its Findings section, notes that "some 43,000,000 Americans have
one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population
as a whole is growing older." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1).
40. See supranotes 18-31 and accompanying text.
41. See supranotes 36-39 and accompanying text.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability").
43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20) (West 1999) (defining "individual with a disability" for
purposes of the antidiscrimination provision in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
44. For a thorough discussion of the social and economic status of disabled people in
the years leading up to the passage of the ADA, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil

Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.413,415-26 (1991).
45. See id. at 416.
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conscious or unconscious failure to take into account the spectrum of
human needs and abilities is itself discriminatory. 46 Disabled people
are not inherently disabled, but are instead actively disabled by a
discriminatory society.
The roots of societal discrimination run deep and play on our
ugliest emotions. Modem scholars have recognized that many nondisabled people harbor fears of disabled people, stemming from
ancient religious beliefs that view disability as an outward sign of
evil. 47 They are reinforced by more modem cultural images equating
disability with social deviance.' However, fear also stems from the
recognition that it is always possible to suffer a misfortune and join
the ranks of the disabled. Many people are terrified to realize that
they do not have control over the continued integrity of their own
bodies and see people with disabilities as reminders of this lack of
control. 49 Some disability activists use the term "temporarily ablebodied" to refer to non-disabled people in an effort to expose these
fears and to make non-disabled people realize that disabled people
are not so different after all.5"
Prejudices against disabled people also stem from society's
unrealistic belief in perfection. Non-disabled people generally
envision a perfect world as one in which there is no suffering and in

46. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 18, at 10 ("[]n an ableist society, the 'normal' people
have constructed the world physically and cognitively to reward those with like abilities
and handicap those with unlike abilities."); see also Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 517-18
(noting that the structuring of "services, facilities, programs and opportunities" to meet
the needs of non-disabled people, while ignoring the needs of those with disabilities,
constitutes discrimination).
47. See LIACHOWrrZ, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that "[m]any explanations of
society's devaluation of physically abnormal people are based on the religious connections
between physical defect and moral defect"); SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 30 (discussing
images of disability in the Old and New Testaments); Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 5
(discussing biblical roots of disability discrimination). But see EIESLAND, supra note 19,
at 98-105 (developing a Christian theology that specifically values Jesus Christ as the
"disabled God").
48. Essayist Kenny Fries notes that "[i]ntroductory guides to screenwriting actually
counsel fledgling authors to give their villain a limp or an amputated limb." FRIES, supra
note 36, at 3; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 30-40 (discussing portrayals of disabled
people in literature, film, television, and advertising).
49. This desire for control of one's own physical integrity and the integrity of others
no doubt led to the eugenics movement that became popular in the United States in the
1920s. See PELKA, supra note 14, at 114-15; SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 271-72.
50. See, e.g., EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 24 (referring to "temporarily able-bodied"
persons who single out disabled people for differential treatment); PELKA, supra note 14,
at 3 (criticizing the belief that people with disabilities are "morally, intellectually, and
spiritually inferior to temporarily able-bodied people").
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In such a

world, disability is unacceptable; it must be cured. The possibility of
cures for all ailments seemed conceivable in the first half of this

century, as the pace of medical advances increased. 2 When even
these advances failed to cure all ills, however, "[d]isabled children
became an affront to the country's postwar faith in 'technology and

progress.' "I Disabled adults were an even greater affront-they had
had the audacity to live long lives without getting better.5 4 Of course,

as medicine advances, there will be more disabled people, not fewer,
because people with illnesses and other physical problems are more

likely to receive treatment that will allow them to live longer lives.55
Thus, society's belief that scientific progress will one day wipe out

disabilities is merely a naive manifestation of the desire to enforce
normalcy.
This desire for normalcy has given rise to numerous damaging
stereotypes surrounding people with disabilities. Because nondisabled people find it difficult to understand how people can live
full, satisfying lives despite mental and physical impairments, they
56
often attribute an exaggerated heroism to people with disabilities.
Disability activists have coined the term "super crip" to mock this
perceived heroism. 5 7 Unfortunately, stories of "heroic" disabled
people who overcome the perceived odds and succeed in society only
perpetuate the idea that most people with disabilities cannot achieve
such success. In addition, these stories tend to focus on the disability
51. For an intriguing discussion of the historic association of normality and perfection,
see DAVIS, supra note 18, at 26-39.
52. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 14-15 (discussing the increasing belief in the 1940s
and 1950s that diseases such as polio eventually would be not only prevented but also
cured).
53. Id. at 15 (quoting from Shapiro's interview with Morgan State University
Professor Marilynn Phillips, who has studied images of poster children).
54. Carol Gill, a disabled essayist, has noted that people with illnesses can be
considered disabled
when they have the temerity to neither get well nor die. Society has a niche for
ill people. They should be on the move, traveling the are from health to sickness
and back to health. There's another niche for people with terminal illnesses.
They should move from health to death. If they know their manners, they get on
with it, too-no "lingering."
Gill, supra note 20, at 47. Kenny Fries echoes the same idea more concisely by describing
society's "kill it or cure it" mentality. FRIES, supranote 36, at 7.
55. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 5-6. In addition, as science furthers our
understanding of all types of impairments, and particularly of mental illness, longstanding
patterns of problematic behavior are likely to be reinterpreted as disabilities,
56. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 534-35 (discussing portrayals of people with
disabilities as "special," "inspirational," or "courageous").
57. See PELKA, supra note 14, at 292.
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itself, rather than physical and attitudinal barriers, as the source of

the "hero's" dilemmas. 58

Therefore, they emphasize individual

strength, rather than societal change, as the key to overcoming

disadvantages. 9
Fear and hatred of the disabled also have led some disabled
people to hide their disabilities and "pass" for able-bodied citizens.60
Others who cannot hide their disabilities may be tempted to give in
to society's demands and take on the role of a "Tiny Tim," one who
ignores indignities and acts "the part of the cheerful 'handicapped'
person, grateful for any crumbs."6' This Tiny Tim image is reflected
in the phenomenon of poster children who are used to stimulate
charitable giving by appealing to both our paternalistic inclinations
and our desire to achieve cures. Several former poster children have
become part of the disability rights movement and have pointed out
the damaging effects of telethons and other charitable events that
rely on pitiable images of disabled people.6 The use of such images
is itself discriminatory because it reinforces the notion that disabled
people must have their needs met through charity rather than
through the enforcement of their own rights. In addition, the
paternalism underlying such tactics "'discourages us as a society
from accepting disability and seeking to accommodate it permanently

58. For examples of some "overcomer" stories, see SHAPIRO, supranote 14, at 16-18.
59. See PELKA, supranote 14, at 292.
60. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is probably the best-known American who practiced
"passing" by arranging never to be photographed in his wheelchair. A new consciousness
regarding this practice was evident in the 1997 controversy over the issue of whether the
new FDR memorial in Washington, D.C., should include a depiction of the Depressionera president in a wheelchair. See, e.g., Mary McGrory, FDR Sits Corrected,WASH. POST,
May 1, 1997, at A2; Michael Wines, Limitations of Statues: Monuments Are a Risky
Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 4, at 1. While the original monument did not depict
a wheelchair, President Clinton promised that such a depiction would be added, and
Congress quickly passed legislation approving the additional sculpture. See Linda
Wheeler, Memorial to FDR Hits No. 1: Most Popular Tourist Spot in D.C. Is Year Old
Today, WASH. POST, May 2, 1998, at D1.
61. PELKA, supra note 14, at 305.
62. In 1991, Mike Ervin and Cris Matthews, two former poster children, organized a
group called Jerry's Orphans specifically to oppose the general tactics and philosophy of
the Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon. See Mary Johnson, A Test of
Wills: Jerry Lewis, Jerry's Orphans and the Telethon, in THE RAGGED EDGE, supra note
20, at 120, 123. Many disability activists were incensed by an article Mr. Lewis published
in the September 2, 1990, issue of PARADE magazine to publicize the annual event. See id.
at 120-21. From the imagined point of view of a person with muscular dystrophy, Lewis
wrote: "'I know the courage it takes to get on the court with other cripples and play
wheelchair basketball ....I realize my life is half, so I must learn to do things halfway. I
just have to learn to try to be good at being half a person.'" Id at 121-22 (quoting Jerry
Lewis, What If I Had MuscularDystrophy?, PARADE, Sept. 2, 1990, at 4,5).
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into our social fabric.' "63
The recognition of paternalism, stereotyping, and failure to
accommodate as forms of discrimination prompted a call for civil
rights for people with disabilities. Activists realized the need to shift
the disability paradigm from a quest for cures to a crusade for rights.
As one activist recalls, "'The day I threw away the holy water from
Lourdes and said to Jesus, "I think they are missing the point" was
the day I joined the movement.' "I Members of the disability rights
movement borrowed tactics from earlier movements including sit-ins
and demonstrations. 65 Among the chief goals of the movement,
which continues today, are recognition of disabled people as full
human beings16 and elimination of physical and attitudinal barriers to
their full participation in society.67 Activists emphasize that these
goals must be met not as a matter of charity or benevolence but as a
matter of right.'
C. Legislation DefiningDisability-BasedDiscrimination
As the disability rights movement grew in the 1970s and 1980s,
federal legislation aimed at expanding opportunities for people with
disabilities was developing as well. 69 The climate of social change
fostered the recognition of the civil rights of various groups, including

63. Johnson, supra note 62, at 124 (quoting disability activist Laura Hershey).
64. JANE CAMPBELL & MIKE OLIVER, DISABILITY POLITICS 110 (1996) (quoting
from the authors' interview with activist Micheline Mason).
65. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 66-68; Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 427-28.
66. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 534 (discussing the notion that "individuals with
disabilities are just people, not essentially different from other people"); Kriegel, supra
note 32, at 55 ("Our complaint against society... is not so much that society ignores our
presence as that it ignores our reality, our sense of ourselves as human beings brave
enough to capture our destinies.... ").
67. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 34 (noting that early disability activists found that
"physical impairment was becoming less handicapping than the barriers of stereotyping
attitudes and architectural constraints").
68. See, e.g., id at 41-42 (discussing rights-based rhetoric in the disability movement);
SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 141 (noting that even after the passage of the ADA,
"nondisabled Americans still had little understanding that this group now demanded
rights, not pity"); Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 426 (noting that the effort to pass laws
prohibiting disability discrimination represented "a shift from charity to civil rights").
69. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999)); Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405-1420
(1994)); The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994));
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
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people with disabilities. 7 ° While prior disability-related legislation

may have been based on a desire to bestow charity rather than to
recognize rights,71 the Rehabilitation Act of 197372 marked an explicit
change in this course. For the first time, broad federal legislation

expressly prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities.73
The Rehabilitation Act's passage galvanized the disability rights

movement, whose members drew inspiration to push for even more
wide-sweeping recognition of civil rights. Eventually, in 1990, the

ADA put in place some of these broader protections. 74

The

circumstances surrounding the passage of each of these acts, and their

reception by the disability rights community, reflect the extent to
which the philosophies of the disability rights movement were
penetrating American society.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as currently
codified, states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his or her
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 7
This single
sentence, appearing at the very end of the Act, was "no more than a
legislative afterthought" in a complex spending bill.76 The rest of the
bill simply allocated funds to federal vocational rehabilitation
programs, which helped disabled citizens prepare to work and live
independently. 77 The antidiscrimination provision was added to a

draft bill by Senate staff members who worked for the Labor and

70. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 5-11 (comparing the disability rights movement to
other civil rights movements of the era).
71. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat.
1329, 1465 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1381 (West 1998)) (establishing the
Social Security Income program, which provides cash payments to disabled people of
limited resources).
72. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796.
73. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prevents recipients of federal financial assistance
from discriminating against people with disabilities on the basis of their disabilities. See
id. § 794(a).
74. While section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act covers only entities receiving federal
financial assistance, see id. § 794(a), the ADA additionally covers certain employers, see
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), state and local governments, see id § 12131(1)(A), and a wide
variety of private entities operating public accommodations, see id- § 12181(7).
75. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a).
76. SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 65.
77. See SCOTCH, supranote 37, at 49.
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Public Welfare Committee." The staffers hastily drafted the onesentence prohibition, using Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196419
as a model.80 In subsequent interviews, these staffers insisted that
section 504 "was an initiative of liberal congressional staff and not
done at the request, suggestion, or demand of outside groups." 81 At
the time, no general disability lobby existed; various organizations of
disabled people had yet to join together in a coordinated attempt to
influence legislation 2 One staffer has noted that the "'Labor
Committee at that time was a highly liberal, activist committee, and
they were in the middle of reacting, I suppose, to Richard Nixon.
And there were a lot of service programs frequently in defiance of
the then Administration.' "83
The legislative history of the original bill containing section 504
reveals that Congress paid little or no attention to the
antidiscrimination provision:
Committee reports contain no
projections of related public expenditures, and even the
Congressional Record contains no references to the significance of
section 504. 4 The bill was vetoed twice before being signed into law
on September 26, 1973.1 Section 504 was not at issue in either veto,
and the enacted version contained the same section 504 language as
its two unsuccessful predecessors. 6 While section 504 was not a
direct product of pressure from disability advocates, its passage was
heralded by the disability community. One advocate called the
provision "historic in its scope and depth, the single most important
civil rights provision ever enacted on behalf of disabled citizens in
this country."'
78. See id. at 47-48 (tracking the history of section 504 through interviews with
congressional staffers involved with its drafting and passage).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d (1994) ("No person ... shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
80. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 52; supra text accompanying note 75 for the precise
language of section 504.
81. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 57; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 64-65
("Disabled people did not even ask for [section 504]. Nor had they lobbied for it.").
82. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 80.
83. Id. at 48 (quoting an interview with former Senate staffer Robert Humphreys).
84. See generally 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076,2076-154 (collecting committee reports and
relevant Congressional Record excerpts). According to one commentator, "most
members of Congress either were unaware that Section 504 was included in the act or saw
the section as little more than a platitude." SCOTCH, supranote 37, at 54,
85. See S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 4 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2077-78.
86. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 54-55.
87. FRANK BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA 205 (1978). The Rehabilitation Act's
passage would spur the developing disability rights movement to advocate for regulations
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2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
While the passage of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was a
significant step toward recognizing the' rights of people with

disabilities, by 1984 advocates were calling for even broader
protections. 8s Because section 504 covers only recipients of federal

financial assistance, it does not prohibit discrimination by private
employers or establishments.

specifically

prohibiting
9 public

employment,
by private entities.91

The ADA rectified this situation by

discrimination

services, 9

in

the

contexts

of

and public accommodations operated

The ADA has been called a "second-generation" civil rights
statute92 because although its general prohibitions echo the language
of section 504,93 its provisions proceed to map out relative rights and
obligations with much greater specificity. For example, the ADA
defines in detail the discriminatory conduct it proscribes. 94 In the

employment context, it specifically prohibits "limiting, segregating,
or classifying" an individual adversely because of a disability,95 using
criteria or tests that have a discriminatory effect,96 and failing to
provide reasonable accommodations that allow disabled employees
to participate fully in the workplace. 97 This recognition of the duty to
accommodate at the statutory level reinforces a key notion of

disability theory:
The present configuration of the world is
discriminatorily skewed to accommodate people with certain physical
to effectuate the Act's policies. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 82-120.
88. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, Eliminating Discrimination
Against Physicallyand Mentally HandicappedPersons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 Mental &
Phys. Disability L. Rep. (ABA Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled) 64,71 (Jan.-Feb. 1984)
(urging Congress to use its interstate commerce authority to pass legislation broadening
the scope of the prohibition on disability discrimination).
89. Title I of the ADA covers employers with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (1994).
90. Title II of the ADA covers state and local governments. See id. § 12131(1).
91. Title Ill of the ADA covers public accommodations, including restaurants,
laundromats, grocery stores, private schools, day care centers, and many other
establishments. See id. § 12181(7).
92. Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 415.
93. Both the ADA and section 504 prohibit discrimination against "qualified
individual[s] with a disability." 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 1999) (Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Title I of the ADA); id. § 12132 (Title II of the
ADA).
94. For an overview of the specific nondiscrimination requirements of the ADA, see
Burgdorf, supranote 44, at 453-91.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
96. See id. § 12112(b)(3), (6)-(7).
97. See id. § 12112(b)(5). Title IlI of the ADA contains similarly specific prohibitions
applicable to public accommodations. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v).
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and mental abilities; in order to eliminate this discrimination, it is
necessary to reconfigure the world so that others may participate in
98

it.

The ADA also spells out relative degrees of obligation that are
applicable in different contexts. Depending on the circumstances,
the ADA may obligate an entity to make accommodations if they are
"readily achievable" 99 or do not create an "undue hardship"' ' or
simply "to the maximum extent feasible." 101 These statutory
standards create express balancing tests for weighing the right to
access against the burdens of accommodation. The specificity with
which the ADA defines discrimination "reflects congressional
dissatisfaction with administrative and judicial interpretations" of
earlier, broader federal disability rights provisions." By defining
disability discrimination in detail in the statute, the ADA's drafters
would not have to rely so heavily on unpredictable judicial and
regulatory interpretations to carry out the Act's purposes.
While they did not participate to a great extent in the passage of
section 504, disability rights advocates did lobby for and shape the
enactment of the ADA.'0 3 One commentator noted that thanks to
American society's increasing awareness of disability discrimination,
the ADA took a "rocket course toward passage."' 1 4 The ADA was
98. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the difference
between reasonable accommodation and discriminatory preferences, see Pamela S. Karlan
& George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (1996).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (requiring public accommodations to remove
architectural and structural barriers "where such removal is readily achievable").
100. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring covered employers to make reasonable
accommodations for their disabled employees unless the accommodations would "impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity").
101. See id. § 12142(c)(1) (prohibiting public entities from using remanufactured public
transportation vehicles unless those vehicles are accessible "to the maximum extent
feasible" to people in wheelchairs); id. § 12183(a)(2) (1994) (requiring public
accommodations to alter their facilities to allow ready access on the part of people with
disabilities "to the maximum extent feasible").
102. Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 510.
103. See PELKA, supra note 14, at 18-22 (summarizing key events leading to the
passage of the ADA and noting that its enactment "was the culmination of work by
thousands of committed individuals").
104. SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 75. Joseph Shapiro notes that the highly visible
protest by deaf students seeking a deaf president at Gallaudet University in 1988 probably
played a role in stirring public sentiment in favor of the ADA bill, which was introduced
two months after the protest ended. See id. While the original bill died as a result of
congressional inaction, see Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 433, a revised ADA bill was
introduced in May 1989, see S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. (1989). By
mid-July, the revised bill had passed both the House and Senate by overwhelming
margins. See 136 CONG. REC. 17376 (1990) (recording the Senate vote of 91 yeas to 6
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signed into law on July 26, 1990, and has been hailed as "the greatest
single achievement of the disability rights movement to date."'10 5
Disability rights activists uniformly praised the passage of the ADA
as a signal accomplishment that would create new opportunities for
people with disabilities to participate in society. 06
III. COMING APART AT THE SEAMS: How THE ADA's LANGUAGE
HAS UNDERMINED THE GOALS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS

MOVEMENT
As explained previously, the much-lauded ADA stemmed from
a civil rights movement whose goal was to redefine disability
discrimination and society's notions of people with disabilities. The
way in which the ADA itself defines "disability," however, has
prevented it from fulfilling its purpose of allowing people with
disabilities full participation in society. Although the ADA clearly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, its compromising,
unworkable definition of that term too often has prevented
legitimate lawsuits from going forward. Numerous judicial decisions
have merely illustrated the definition's 'many inherent problems,
rather than shedding light on the definition. Even a recent U.S.
Supreme Court opinion offers scant guidance as to how the ADA's
specific definitional provisions can operate to fulfill the statute's
7
purpose of eliminating discrimination and fostering integration.'
A. An Overview of the ADA's Non-DiscriminationProvisions
1. The Establishment of a Protected Class
The ADA states specifically that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual" in regard to matters of
nays); 136 CONG REC. 17296 (1990) (recording the House vote of 377 yeas to 28 nays).
105. PELKA, supranote 14, at 18. President George Bush, who signed the bill into law,
later noted that "[w]ith the ADA, our country took a dramatic step toward eliminating the
physical barriers that existed and the social barriers that were accepted." George Bush,
Introductory Note from the Office of Former PresidentGeorge Bush, in A LOOK BACK:
THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1, 1 (Robert C. Anderson ed.,

1996) [hereinafter A LOOK BACK].
106. See, e.g., EIESLAND, supra note 19, at 19 (calling the ADA an "emancipation
proclamation" for people with disabilities); SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 140-41 (calling the
ADA's passage "an earthshaking event for disabled people" and claiming that the ADA
"signaled a radical transformation in the way they saw themselves-as a minority that now
had rights to challenge its exclusion").
107. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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employment.108 With respect to public services, the ADA states that
"no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination."' 10 9 Unlike federal statutes prohibiting
other types of discrimination,"0 the ADA, in these two provisions,
establishes a protected class."' Specifically, a plaintiff must first
prove that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" before the
plaintiff will have a chance to prove that the defendant engaged in
discriminatory conduct. This protected class element is explicit in
Titles I and II, which cover private employers and state and local
governments, respectively.12 Even under the public accommodations
provisions of Title III, where the statute is not phrased in terms of a
"qualified individual with a disability," plaintiffs must first prove
their disabled status in order to pursue a discrimination suit.1 3 Thus,
the plaintiff in an ADA suit has an extra hurdle to overcome. While
a woman bringing a sex discrimination suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a black person bringing a race
discrimination suit under the same statute need not prove their sex or
race," 4 the ADA plaintiff is forced to prove his disability status in
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
109. Id. § 12132.
110. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting discrimination simply on the basis
of race, sex, and religion, among other grounds). Courts have held that people of any race,
sex, or religious belief can invoke Title VII's protections. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-87 (1976) (holding that the race discrimination clause
of Title VII prohibits discrimination against white people as well as black people); Young
v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
religious discrimination clause of Title VII prohibits discrimination against members of
specific religions as well as atheists); Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the sex discrimination clause of Title VII prohibits
discrimination against men as well as women).
111. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 423-27 (criticizing the "protected-class" structure
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which the ADA adopted); Burgdorf, supra note
44, at 441-44 (criticizing the "protected-class" structure of the ADA's protections).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Title I); id. § 12132(a) (Title II).
113. The Title III prohibition states simply that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of... any place of public
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Nevertheless, even under Title III, a plaintiff has
the burden of proving that she has a "disability." See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d
934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a Title III ADA case by a patient against a dentist
"must start with an investigation into the patient's status"), vacated,118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).
114. See supra note 110. If such requirements existed, proving race or sex in some
cases could be harder than one would first imagine. See, e.g., Christine B. Hickman, The
Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,African Americans, and the U.S. Census,
95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1242-44 (1997) (rejecting essentialist concepts of racial identity);
Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: ReconsideringDirectiveNo. 15 and the Classification
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accordance with the statutory definition before a court can even
115
consider whether the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct.
The "protected class" structure of the ADA echoes a similar
provision in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.116 While
no legislative history explains why section 504 was drafted to protect
only a "qualified handicapped individual""' 7 (later changed to "an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability")," one scholar has
speculated that the drafters" 9 of section 504 hastily included this
language to clarify that the prohibition on disability discrimination
would not require employers to hire unqualified people. 2 The
creation of a protected class was not necessary to accomplish this
purpose, however. Title VII, for example, allows employers to use
criteria that are "job related" and "consistent with business

necessity" without speaking in terms of protected classes.'

The

ADA itself explicitly allows employers to use criteria that "tend to
of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1239-42 (1997) (analyzing the social
construction of race); john a. powell, The Multiple Self. Exploring Between and Beyond
Modernity and Postmodernity,81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1481 (1997) (noting that we "are all
androgynous" because each of us "contains the other-male in female, female in male");
Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305, 324 (1990) (criticizing the dualism with which society views
racial identity); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and
Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 3, 281 (1995) (noting various models for the determination of
gender identity).
115. See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1998); Olson v. Dubuque
Community Sch. Dist., 137 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1998); Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
120 F.3d 50,51 (5th Cir. 1997); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
116. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 1999) (stating that "no otherwise qualified
individual with a disability" shall be subject to discrimination because of the disability).
117. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 427.
118. Congress substituted the new wording in 1992.
See Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102, 106 Stat. 4346, 4360 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a)).
119. For a detailed account of the drafting of section 504 by congressional staffers, see
SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 51-52.
120. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 428. The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare ("HEW"), which issued regulations and interpretive guidelines regarding section
504, sought to reassure recipients of federal funds that the words "otherwise qualified"
were not meant to be read literally. The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), to which section
504 enforcement authority was transferred in 1980, adopted verbatim the HEW guidance
on this point: "Under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the qualifications
for driving a bus except sight could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of
driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by Congress." 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A
(1998) (discussing the definition of "qualified handicapped individual").
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (setting forth the burden of proof in
disparate impact cases).
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screen out ... an individual with a disability," provided that the
122
criteria are "job-related and consistent with business necessity."
The restriction of the ADA's protections to "qualified individuals
with disabilities" is therefore entirely unnecessary. Moreover, even if
the term "qualified" were needed to clarify that employers and public
entities could establish bona fide eligibility criteria, there is still no
apparent need for the word "handicapped" or "disabled" to appear in
the same phrase.
Another possible rationale behind the protected class structure
is the fear that people who are not "truly disabled" will somehow
take advantage of antidiscrimination laws.113 As disability scholars
have noted, society is willing to protect those it considers disabled,
but only so long as they conform to societal stereotypes.2 4 This
prejudice undoubtedly accounts for the ADA regulations that
require a disability to be severe and long-lasting. 12 In addition, the
establishment of a defined, protected class is consistent with society's
tendency to draw lines between "disabled" people and "nondisabled" people, even if those lines are arbitrary in the end. 6 The
protected class formulation also coincides with society's tendency to
see disability as a personal trait rather than a societal construct. 127 In
sum, because the ADA requires plaintiffs to prove their membership

122. Id. § 12113(a) (1994).
123. Courts have read this rationale into the Rehabilitation Act's disability definition,
whether or not it was originally there. See, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act was not intended to cover "commonplace"
personality disorders); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The
Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will not
face discrimination .... It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections
available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose disability was
minor .... ).
124. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.20)(2)(i), (ii) (1998)).
126. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. This line-drawing comports with
what Martha Minow has called the "abnormal-persons" approach to dealing with
differences between people. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 105-07 (1990); see also Ruth Colker, Bi:
Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 60-64 (1995)
(criticizing the ADA's bipolar categorization of people based upon the presence or
absence of "disability"); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions
Between the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and FederalDisability Benefit Programs,76
TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1026-29 (1998) (discussing Martha Minow's work).
Bipolar
categorization of this type is at odds with Minow's "social relations" approach to
difference, see MINOW, supra, at 215-16, which seems to underlie the statutory
requirement of reasonable accommodation, see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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in a class of people with disabilities, the statute focuses on the
plaintiff's status rather than on the defendant's allegedly
discriminatory conduct. Such a focus is wrong-headed; the purpose
of the ADA is not to categorize individuals but rather to fight
disability-based discrimination. 128
2. The Individual Elements of the "Disability" Definition
Because ADA plaintiffs must prove their "disabled" status in
order to maintain a discrimination suit, the way in which the statute
defines "disability" can make or break a given claim. Titles I, II, and
III of the ADA each incorporate the following definition of
"disability":
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
129
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Drafters of the ADA lifted this definition from the
Rehabilitation Act, to which it had been added by amendment in
1974.130 They found the previous definition in the Rehabilitation Act
to be unworkable for purposes of the antidiscrimination provision in
section 504.'1' Legislative history regarding section 504 reveals that
the later three-pronged definition was designed to address different
types of disability discrimination. 32 The first prong was meant to
address direct discrimination based on actual disability and to
provide a definition to facilitate the statute's disability-based
affirmative action requirements 3 3 The remaining two prongs were
designed to address discrimination stemming from classification of
All three prongs
and perceptions regarding disabilities."
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
129. Id. § 12102(2).
130. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9)(B) (West 1999)).
131. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388
(noting that the previous definition focused on employability and the potential to benefit
from rehabilitation services and did not take account of discrimination issues).
132 See id. at 38, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389-90.
133. See id. at 39, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6390 (stating that the affirmative
action obligations of 29 U.S.C. §791(b) (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 791(b)), can be fulfilled only by the hiring and advancement of persons with actual
disabilities, rather than "persons marginally or previously handicapped or persons
'regarded as' handicapped").
134. See id. at 38-39, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389-90.
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incorporate the elements of "major life activities" and "substantial
limitations,"'35 and both of these elements are problematic, as are
other aspects of the definition.
a. Major Life Activities
The legislative history does not reveal why actual disabilities are
defined in terms of limitations on "major life activities." This bit of
bureaucratic language not only is vague but also runs counter to the
notions of the disability rights movement and fails to capture the

overall intent of the drafters. 6 If the disability label has historically
depended upon arbitrary notions of the activities that people should
be able to perform and the ways in which they should perform

them, 37 then the categorization of some activities as "major" takes
this arbitrariness one step further. An adherent of the Deaf Culture
movement,'3 8 for example, would probably not classify "hearing" as a
particularly important activity, even though most Americans, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and the Equal Employment
' 139
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") would classify it as "major."

Other activities present difficult situations even for more mainstream
4
thinkers: lifting,'140 caring for others,'141 and having children. 1
135. The first prong explicitly requires an "impairment that substantially limits ... [a]
major life activit[y]." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). The second and third prongs both refer
back to "such an impairment." Id.
136. The use of the word "major" in the disability definition tends to have a narrowing
effect, despite the legislative history indicating that "major life activities" may include a
broad array of general activities. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452 (enjoying goods and services); id. pt. 2, at 52, reprintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (participating in community activities); id. pt. 2, at 53,
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335 (eating in a restaurant).
137. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
139. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998) (providing the DOJ definition of major life activities
for Title II of the ADA to include "hearing," among other functions); id. § 36.104
(providing the same definition for the DOJ regulation implementing Title III of the
ADA); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998) (providing the same definition for the EEOC
regulation implementing Title I of the ADA).
140. Compare Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to recognize heavy lifting as a major life activity), with Lowe v. Angelo's Italian
Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170,1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing lifting as a major life activity).
141. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996)
(stating that caring for others is not a major life activity). Interacting with others,
however, may be a major life activity. See Krocka v. Bransfield, 969 F. Supp. 1073, 1084-85
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding factual issues existed as to plaintiff's limitations in the activities of
interacting with others and working).
142. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998) (stating that
reproduction is a major life activity). Before Bragdon, courts had split over the issue.
Compare Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677 (stating that reproduction is not a major life activity), and
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Regulations promulgated by the EEOC and the Department of
Justice regarding this issue fail to explain why particular activities are
considered "major," or what kind of importance to the human
experience the word "major" was meant to convey. The regulations
simply define major life activities as "functions such as caring for
seeing, hearing,
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
1' 43

speaking, breathing, learning, and working.'
It is hard to identify the common thread that links the items on
this list. One item, breathing, is a physiological function that is
necessary to all life. Other items, seeing and hearing, are sensory
functions that are not quite so crucial to human existence. Still
others, walking, speaking, and performing manual tasks, are physical
acts of a more abstract nature, while the final three, learning,
working, and caring for oneself, are quite abstract, not universally
The
performed, and not necessarily predominantly physical.
variation in this list makes it difficult to take up the regulatory

invitation to identify other activities "such as" these.'"
Furthermore, the inquiry into which "life activities" are "major"
begs an inquiry into which activities make us human and give us
value. 145 Presumably, one who cannot perform a "major life activity"
does not have much of a life. Yet the entire disability rights
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
("We agree that procreation is a fundamental human activity, but are not certain that it is
one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA."), with Abbott v.Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing reproduction as a major life activity), vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co., 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (M.D.
1996)
Fla. 1997) (same), and Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. Ill.
(same).
143. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104,36.104 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
144. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104,36.104; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
145. The quest to determine which activities are "major" is not unlike the inquiry
undertaken by eighteenth century philosophers as to which actions make us human. See
DAVIS, supra note 18, at 55 (noting that scientists of that era studied deaf people for
insight into the nature of human beings); HARLAN LANE, THE WILD BOY OF AvEYRON
19-24 (1976) (describing how a mute boy, found in the French woods in 1797, reopened the
philosophical question of whether speech was a necessary criterion that separated humans
from animals).
Liachowitz notes that society has valued human beings in terms of their productivity
and that this value system has become entrenched in American disability legislation. See
LIACHOWIz, supra note 18, at 9. Similarly, Cynthia Griggins states:
An entire rehabilitation system is built on this premise-that a human being is
the sum of a number of functions. By definition, a fully rehabilitated individual
is that person who can perform each and every function of which he is physically
capable.... How on earth did we get to this definition of a human being? What
makes "functions" so important? And how does this affect our attitudes toward
the disabled?
Griggins, supra note 31, at 37.
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movement has tried to counsel society to rethink entrenched notions

of which abilities are necessary to a valuable life and to think of
people not in terms of what they can or cannot do but rather in terms

of who they are.146 Defining people with disabilities as a function of
their capacity to participate in or perform "major life activities"
denigrates the value of their lives. 47
b.

Substantial Limitations

Even if one could determine which "life activities" are "major,"
the ADA requires an additional inquiry to determine whether an

impairment "substantially limits" a person in performing these
activities. This language indicates a desire to restrict the ADA's
coverage to the "truly disabled," that is, those upon whom society

feels good about exercising its charitable impulses. 48 People whose
impairments are less severe-those who lack Tiny Tim's need for a
crutch149-are viewed with suspicion, even when they have suffered
discrimination because of an impairment. 50
Evidence exists, however, that Congress intended the ADA's
disability definition to cover people who were not necessarily limited
in their activities. People with serious diseases controlled by
medication, for example, certainly were meant to be covered.151
Nevertheless, the text of the ADA's definition, phrased in terms of
"substantial limitation," conveys the opposite meaning. Moreover,
by excluding temporary5 2 and less than severels' impairments from

146. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
147. See LIACHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 10-11 (discussing the devaluation of the lives
of individuals with disabilities).
148. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying note 61.
150. For example, Colker discusses charges of "'abuse' of the disability rights law by
individuals who are not 'really' disabled, such as individuals with attention deficit
disorder." Colker, supra note 126, at 53. Additionally, the statute excludes people with
certain types of severe impairments from its purview. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994)
(excepting, inter alia, kleptomania, pyromania, transvestism, certain gender identity
disorders, and other listed impairments from the definition of "disability" in § 12102).
Apparently, whether or not it believes disability discrimination is wrong as a matter of
principle, society has identified some people with disabilities whom it deems unworthy of
protection.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334.
152. Regulations indicate that "duration" of the impairment is relevant to whether it is
"substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) (1998).
153. Regulations also indicate that the "nature and severity" of the impairment are
relevant to whether it "substantially limits" major life activities. Id. § 1630.20)(2)(i).
However, many "conditions traditionally considered to be 'disabilities' [such as diseases in
remission or facial disfigurements] may not have a substantial impact on performance of
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coverage, the ADA throws into question the nature of the harm it

seeks to prevent. If an employer or an owner of a public
accommodation has put a qualified person at a disadvantage because
of the individual's mental or physical impairment, why should the
severity or duration of the impairment matter? Because the harm
lies in the actor's irrational reliance on a mental or physical
impairment, which presumably stems from misconceptions and
prejudices about people with impairments, the potential for such
misconceptions and prejudices does not depend upon the duration or
severity of the impairment. Furthermore, the harm to the individual
is the same, no matter what the particular qualities of her
impairment. The employee discharged because of his rheumatoid
arthritis is in the same position as the person who was fired because
of her rheumatoid arthritis that happens to be in remission: Both
have lost jobs.15 4

If the ADA recognizes the claim of one person with rheumatoid
arthritis but not the other, it seems to indicate that the nature of the

right being protected depends upon the nature of the impairment.
However, it seems contrary to logic to assert that one person has a

right to be free from prejudicial decisions based on his impairment
while another does not.

If the right is couched as the right to

participate fully in society, 55 it is similarly difficult to understand why
the ADA would protect this interest on behalf of someone whose
impairment substantially limits her but not on behalf of someone
with a less limiting impairment.
Further, the "substantial limitation" element, like the "major life
activity" element, is based upon relative notions of how people
should perform certain functions. 6 Regulations interpreting the
"substantial limitation" element betray this relativity. Phrased in
terms of the "average person in the general population,"'57 the
major life activities." Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 448.
154. The definition's inclusion of people with a record of disability and those who have
been regarded as having a disability will not necessarily save the plaintiff whose disease is
in remission. See infra notes 353-55,367-74 and accompanying text.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (listing "full participation" by people with disabilities
as one of the nation's goals). This goal appears to be based on a moral imperative that
society allow all people the opportunity to flourish and not merely to exist. See Helen R.
Betenbaugh, ADA and the Religious Community: The Moral Case, in A LOOK BACK,
supranote 105, at 47, 65-66 (discussing the moral notion of "flourishing").
156. People will always differ as to what they consider limitations. Nancy Eiesland
describes a woman who considers herself able to "walk" without assistive devices, even
though she has no legs. See EIESLAND, supranote 19, at 37.
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (defining "substantially limits" as "(i) Unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
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regulations imply that people with disabilities not only fall outside of
the "general" population, but also that everyone can agree exactly as
to how the "average" human in this population should perform.
c.

The "Record Of" and "Regarded As" Prongs

The second and third prongs of the disability definition indicate
that disability can be socially constructed. People may be "disabled"
under these prongs based upon society's previous observations and
perceptions of them. 58 However, because the second and third
prongs of the disability definition incorporate the elements of "major
life activities" and "substantial limitations," they raise the same
contradictions and questions as the first prong. 15 9 The "record of"
prong, for example, states that a disability can consist of "a record of
such an impairment."' 160 "Such an impairment" refers to the first
prong's mention of an impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities. 61 Thus, all of the difficulties regarding
these elements resurface in the second prong of the definition.
Similarly, the "regarded as" prong language refers back to "being
regarded as having such an impairment" and thus raises identical
problems. 2 Regulations expanding upon the "regarded as" prong
indicate that one can qualify as "disabled" if one has "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only
perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to ... the
average person in the general population").
158. These prongs do not escape the problems inherent in the ADA's protected class
structure, however. Legislative history indicates that these prongs, as they originally
appeared in the Rehabilitation Act, covered "persons who are discriminated against on
the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact handicapped, just as ...the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the
person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial minority." S. REP. No. 931297, at 39 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-90. However, this assertion
is not accurate. The three-pronged disability definition still divides the world into those
who are (or have a record of, or have been regarded as) disabled, and those who are not.
By contrast, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act does not divide the world into those who are
(or have a record of being, or have been regarded as being) members of a particular race
and those who are not. This difference stems from the fact that everyone has a race, but
not everyone, according to societal constructions, has a disability. Thus, plaintiffs in
disability discrimination suits have a unique burden of proving their own status as
individuals with disabilities. The fact that they can satisfy the burden with evidence of
medical records or societal perceptions does not mean that this unique burden does not
exist.
159. See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment."'' 3 This
interpretation does not coincide with the literal language of the
statute, which requires that one be regarded as having an impairment
that, in itself, substantially limits a major life activity. 164 Nevertheless,
the regulation seems consistent with congressional intent. 6 ' This
consistency, 166 taken in tandem with the presumption that Congress
validated existing regulatory interpretations of the Rehabilitation
Act's identical "disability" definition when it passed the ADA, 67
strongly supports the construction of the third prong to include
limitations caused by societal attitudes. Even so the convoluted
statutory language does little to inform potential litigants that this

avenue of coverage is available. 68

163. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104,36.104 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (1998).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
165. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
335 (noting that the "regarded as" prong includes those whose limitations stem only from
the attitudes of others toward an actual or perceived impairment).
166. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."). Even Chevron, however, leaves open the question of whether a regulation is
valid if it coincides with congressional intent in a situation in which the literal language of
a poorly drafted statute contradicts this intent.
167. The ADA specifically directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to
implement its provisions and requires that such regulations "be consistent" with existing
regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which includes the regulation
regarding societal attitudes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)-(b). A strong argument exists
therefore that Congress retroactively validated the existing section 504 regulations when it
See William G. Buss, Human
passed this particular provision of the ADA.
Immunodeficiency Virus, the Legal Meaning of "Handicap," and Implications for Public
Education Under FederalLaw at the Dawn of the Age of the ADA, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1389,
1444 (1992). In addition, the ADA states that it does not "apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [which includes section
504] or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(a). This provision demonstrates that Congress was aware of and approved of the
"societal attitude" regulation and other section 504 regulations when it passed the ADA in
1990.
168. Courts do not always see this avenue, either. Numerous courts have held that
even if an employer terminates an employee because of a negative attitude toward the
employee's physical impairment, the employee has not been substantially limited in
working due to the attitudes of others and, therefore, is not disabled. See, e.g.,
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 172-74 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(basing analysis of the "regarded as" prong on whether the employer regarded the
employee as having a substantially limiting impairment, rather than on whether the
employer's attitude toward the employee's HIV status caused his dismissal); Wooten v.
Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring that "other people treat [the
plaintiff] as having a substantially limiting impairment" in order for the plaintiff to qualify
as disabled under the "regarded as" prong); see also infra notes 369-413 and accompanying
text (discussing the "regarded as" prong).

1434
B.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

JudicialApplicationsof the ADA's DisabilityDefinition

Courts, of course, are bound to decide ADA cases in accordance
with the tangled language of the statute's definition of disability.
Since the definition first appeared in the Rehabilitation Act, judicial
decisions have shown signs of confusion and inconsistency regarding
its application to specific facts. By taking the three-prong test at its
word, courts have thrown out cases that Congress surely intended to
go forward. 69 While one commentator predicted that the passage of
the ADA would ameliorate interpretive problems regarding "major
life activities" and other elements of the disability definition, 170 such
has not been the case. In fact, a recent study conducted by the
American Bar Association's Commission on Mental and Physical
Disability Law revealed that the definition is "much more restrictive
than those who drafted and supported the ADA had thought it would
be" and has resulted in the summary dismissal of a large number of
cases between 1992 and 1998.171 For example, cases decided under
the ADA have found diseases as serious as hemophilia, diabetes, and
cancer not to satisfy the statutory elements of a disability, 7 2 even
though legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend such
results. 7 3 Recently, the Supreme Court examined the ADA's

169. See infra notes 247-52, 255-56, 302-11, 317-23, 327-32, 339-43, 353-55, 367-68, and
381-93 and accompanying text.
170. See Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 449.
171. Employers Win, supra note 8, at 405. The study found that in judicial cases in
which one party clearly prevailed, 92% of decisions favored employers. See id. at 404.
About one third of employer wins occurred through summary judgment. See id.
172 See, e.g, Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
plaintiff with hemophilia was not disabled), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997); Ellison V.
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff with cancer
was not disabled); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(finding that a plaintiff with diabetes was not disabled). A recent study noted that in 110
cases decided during late 1995 and 1996, courts failed to deem a challenged condition a
"disability" in 80 cases and reached no determination on the issue in 24 cases. See Thomas
D'Agostino, Defining "Disability"Underthe ADA: 1997 Update, Nat'l Disability L. Rep.,
Special Rep. No. 3 (LRP) 13 (1997). These statistics indicate that "challenging a plaintiffs
status as an individual with a disability under the ADA is a defense tactic that is being
utilized with increasing frequency ...[and is], on the whole, an amazingly successful
strategy for employers." Id. at iii.
173. Congress deliberately defined "disability" broadly. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 51-54 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-36. For example, Congress
specifically intended the category of individuals with disabilities to include those whose
impairments are corrected by auxiliary aids or medications, see id. at 52-53, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; those who are no longer disabled but have histories of
disability, see id.; and those who have never been disabled at all but are regarded as being
disabled, see id. at 53, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335.
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disability definition, 7 4 but the guidance it could provide was limited
by the inherently problematic statutory language. Many questions
regarding the application of the three-prong test remain. Therefore,
the lower courts will have to continue their rambling interpretative
courses unless some change is made to the statutory language itself.
1. Judicial Interpretation of the "Major Life Activity" Element
a.

Supreme Court Guidance from Bragdon v. Abbott

In Bragdon v. Abbott,175 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether reproduction was a major life activity under the
ADA. Deciding that it was, the Court offered some limited guidance
that will direct lower courts when they analyze other activities in
future cases. The Bragdon case arose when Sidney Abbott, the
plaintiff, went to the office of the defendant, Randon Bragdon, for a
dental examination.'76 Bragdon informed Abbott, who was HIVpositive but asymptomatic, that he would not be able to fill her cavity
in his office because of the risk of infection. 7 7 He offered to perform

the work at a hospital at no extra charge, although Abbott would
have to pay for the use of the hospital facilities. 78 Abbott declined
the offer and filed a discrimination suit against Bragdon under Title
III of the ADA.

179

Although Title III's protections are not phrased in terms of a
protected class of individuals with disabilities,8 0 the district court,'
the First Circuit,8 2 and the Supreme Court'13 each began the analysis
of the ADA claim by addressing whether Abbott's HIV-positive but
asymptomatic status qualified her as disabled. The district court held
that Abbott was indeed disabled and that Bragdon had discriminated
against her as a matter of law." 4 It therefore granted Abbott
summary judgment.'
The First Circuit affirmed,'86 and Bragdon
174. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
175. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
176. See id. at 2201.

177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See iL
180. See supra note 113 (quoting the applicable Title III language).
181. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D. Me. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 934
(1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
182. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 938.
183. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
184. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 587, 595.

185. See id.
186. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949.
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appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that
Abbott was not disabled because her asymptomatic HIV did not

substantially limit her in any major life activities."8
The only major life activity raised in the lower court and
considered by the First Circuit was reproduction. The Supreme
Court majority"u therefore limited its analysis to this activity." 9 In

deciding that reproduction is in fact a major life activity, the Court
defined "major"
in terms of "comparative importance" and
90
"significance."'

The Court reasoned that because "[r]eproduction
and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process

itself,"'19 reproduction must qualify as a major life activity.

It

explained that its holding was buttressed by administrative
precedent' 19 in the form of a 1988 opinion issued by the Office of

Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice ("OLC"), which noted
that asymptomatic HIV qualifies as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act. 3 The OLC opinion stated that asymptomatic
HIV could limit the "'life activity of procreation.' "194 The opinion,
however, did not explain why the OLC had found procreation to be a

major life activity. The Court also relied on agency regulations. It
noted that regulations under the Rehabilitation Act specifically list

working and learning as major life activities' 95 and that "reproduction
could not be regarded as any less important than working and
learning."' 96 The Court rejected Bragdon's argument, based on the

regulatory list, that major life activities must have a "public,
economic, or daily character. '' "w Citing the "breadth" of the term

187. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
188. Justice Kennedy authored the Court's opinion. See id. at 2200. He was joined in
the majority by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. Justice Ginsburg
filed her own concurring opinion, see id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), as did Justice
Stevens, see id (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens's
concurrence. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
189. See id. at 2205.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 2207 ("[Tlhe well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute
'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.'" (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40
(1944)).
193. See id. (citing Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIVInfected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264,264-65 (1988)).
194. Id. (quoting 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 273).
195. See id. at 2205 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1998); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)
(1998)).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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"major," the Court held that the word referred to general importance

rather than frequency, publicity, or lucrativeness.

8

While the

activities on the regulatory list might be characterized in these
terms,'9 9 the Court noted that the words "such as," which preface the

list, mean that activities that are important for other reasons can
qualify as well. 0
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg employed a much
broader analysis that discussed activities other than reproduction. 01'
She noted that HIV "has been regarded as a disease limiting life
itself" and that it "inevitably pervades life's choices: education,
employment, family and financial undertakings. ' 2°
Citing
regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act, 20 3 she listed
maintaining family relations, securing employment, and caring for
oneself as among the major life activities that HIV limits.2 4 Her
common-sense opinion did not labor over the nuances of the word
"major" or the technicalities of how and when such major activities
might be limited. Instead, it was driven by the overarching notion
that "[n]o rational legislator ... would require nondiscrimination

once symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the
disease, though present, is not yet visible."2

5

She began with the

proposition that any reasonable person would have to consider HIV
a disability and proceeded, in general terms, to connect this idea to
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
202. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
203. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(a) (1998) (providing DOJ regulation defining "handicapped
person"); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1998) (providing the Department of Health and Human
Services regulation defining "handicapped person").
204. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205. L at 2213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The majority in Bragdon remarked upon
the "uniformity of the administrative and judicial precedent construing the definition" of
"disability" in the Rehabilitation Act to include both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV
infection. Id. at 2208. Because this precedent existed when Congress repeated the
"disability" definition in the ADA, the Bragdon majority reasoned that Congress intended
to incorporate this interpretation into the newer statute. See id. This view is consistent
with the HIV-as-one-disease argument articulated by Buss. See Buss, supra note 167, at
1428. According to Buss, this argument "has the disadvantage of depending on an
artificial construct under which the third [symptomatic] stage of the disease is treated as if
it had already occurred, even though it might not occur for years into the future." Id. at
1429. However, because societal misperceptions stem from fears of the third, and deadly,
stage of the disease, and because discrimination based on these fears can occur even
against individuals whose infections have not yet reached that stage, the collapsing of the
stages into a single disease is an appropriate analytical step in a disability discrimination
case.
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various possible major life activities. This analysis recognizes both
Congress's intent to include diseases such as asymptomatic HIV as a
disability" 6 and the fact that the language of the definition does a
poor job of reflecting this intent. °7
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist 28 wrote that
reproduction cannot qualify as a major life activity under the ADA.
Unlike the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist defined "major" as
" 'greater in quantity, number, or extent.' "209 He noted that this
definition is more consistent with the list of major life activities in the
ADA regulation than is the majority's definition, which focused on
significance and importance. 210
Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged the importance of reproduction to human life, but
noted that "[f]undamental importance of this sort is not the common
thread linking the ... listed activities. The common thread is rather

that the activities are repetitively performed and essential in the dayto-day existence of a normally functioning individual."2"' Because
reproduction does not share this thread, Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not deem it a major life activity.212 Justice O'Connor, writing
separately, echoed this view: "[T]he act of giving birth to a child,
while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not
generally the same as the representative major life activities of all

206. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that lawmakers understood that the
Act would cover anyone infected with HIV. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 31, 48
(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313, 330 (citing PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON
THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 123 (June 1988)); S.

REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989); see also Robert A. Kushen, Note, Asymptomatic Infection
with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 88 COLUM. L.

REV. 563, 567 (1988) (noting that "congressional intent to establish consistent and uniform
standards of coverage would be furthered by giving protection to asymptomatic HIV
carriers as well as AIDS victims" under the identically worded disability definition in the
Rehabilitation Act).
207. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal
Impact of the New Social Constructionof HIV, 23 AM J.L. & MED. 7, 41 (1997) (criticizing
"plain language" interpretations of the statutory definition as overlooking the true intent
of the drafters).
208. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. See
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor joined the opinion as to the issue of whether Abbott
posed a direct threat, but drafted her own opinion as to whether Abbott was disabled. See
id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id.at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 702 (10th ed. 1994)).
210. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
211. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
212 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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persons ... listed in [the] regulations.
Chief

Justice

Rehnquist

also

213

rejected

the

notion

that

reproduction automatically should qualify in light of regulations
issued under the ADA that define the term "physical impairment" to
include disorders affecting the reproductive system. 14 He wrote that

"this argument is simply wrong" and noted that reproductive
disorders can limit one's ability "to engage in numerous activities

other than reproduction.""2 5 While the majority did not address this
2 16
argument, one lower court in Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, InC.

has confronted the issue of whether a physiological function
referenced in the regulatory definition of "impairment"
automatically becomes a "major life activity."'

7

In Zatarain, the

court expressed the implied reasoning behind Chief Justice
Rehnquist's similar conclusion: "[T]he major life activity that is
allegedly limited is separate and distinct from the impairment that

limits it.

'2 18

To hold otherwise, the court noted, "would allow [a

litigant] to bootstrap a finding of substantial
limitation of a major life
'219
activity on to a finding of an impairment.
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered more case-specific
reasons for rejecting reproduction as a major life activity. Noting
that the statutory language refers to " 'one or more ... major life

activities of such individual,' ,22

he wrote that the generalized

analysis of the majority "truncates the question, perhaps because

there is not a shred of record evidence indicating that, prior to
becoming infected with HIV, [Abbott's] major life activities included

213. 1L at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). It is unclear what Justice O'Connor means by the words "all persons." The only
universally performed activity on the regulatory list is "breathing." See supra note 143 and
accompanying text. Her previous reference to "the lives of many women" may indicate
that if an activity cannot be performed at all by some group of unimpaired people (in this
case, males), then it cannot qualify as a major life activity.
214. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (providing the DOJ
regulation implementing Title III of the ADA)).
215. Id- (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
216. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), affd mem., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision).
217. See id. at 243 (holding that a plaintiff with a reproductive disorder was not
disabled because reproduction was not a major life activity).
218. Id.
219. IM; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 207, at 26-27 (discussing the notion of
deriving major life activities from specific physical impairments).
220. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
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reproduction."" 1 Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation, a
plaintiff would have to show that a particular act is "a major life
activity to her."' He would require a plaintiff relying on the activity
of reproduction to muster evidence showing that she "would have
had or was even considering having children" before her impairment
arose.'
In Abbott's case, the record showed nothing regarding
Abbott's plans for a family before she became infected; it revealed
only that she had decided, upon learning of her HIV, not to have
children. 2 4 The majority in Bragdon did not explicitly address the
issue of whether a major life activity must be specific to the plaintiff.
By speaking of reproduction in general terms, however, its opinion
implies that specificity is not required.
b.

Questions Remaining for the Lower Courts

(1) Which Activities Are SignificantEnough to Be Deemed "Major"?
While the Court in Bragdon definitively answered the question
of whether reproduction qualifies as a major life activity,2 26 at least in
terms of a female plaintiff of child-bearing age, it has left open many
issues regarding the application of the "major life activity" element.
First, by defining "major" as "significant," the opinion permits lower
courts to assess the comparative significance of any activities that
plaintiffs might raise. Few questions could be more subjective than
the comparative general importance of various human activities.
Indeed, even a court employing the definition of "major" espoused
by the Bragdon majority could reach the opposite result on the

221. Id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
222 Id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[D]isability should be evaluated on an individualized basis and... [Abbott] has
not proven that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one or more of her
major life activities.").
223. Id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
224. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
225. The only mention of reproduction in the context of Sidney Abbott's life appears in
the following sentence: "Respondent's claim throughout this case has been that the HIV
infection placed a substantial limitation on her ability to reproduce and to bear children."
Id. at 2204 (emphasis added). The remainder of the opinion discusses reproduction, and
the limits posed on it by HIV, in only general terms. In her separate opinion, Justice
Ginsburg speaks exclusively in general terms, referring to HIV's limiting effects on "life
itself" and "life's choices." Id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
226. See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
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question of whether reproduction is major in this sense. 27
Had Bragdon been decided years ago, it is hard to tell what help
it would have offered to courts faced with deciding whether a given
activity was major. For example, in United States v. Happy Time Day
Care Centerm another HIV-related case at the district court level,
the plaintiff's argument regarding disability turned on the activities of
"growing" and "socializing," among others.2 9 The case concerned
several day care centers that had refused to admit an HIV-positive
three-year-old boy.?0 The district court avoided the question of
whether growing and socializing were major life activities by first
determining that the boy was not limited in these activities. 231
Nevertheless, if the court had been obligated to address the question,
it would have had to make a determination with little or no guidance
from the statute, the regulations, or the higher courts.
Even if the Supreme Court's opinion in Bragdon had been
available, the district court would have known from the highest court
only that it was supposed to assess the relative importance of growing

and socializing, as compared to other known major life activities such
as hearing, breathing, working, learning, and now-after Bragdonreproduction. The universal physical function of growing would
probably make the grade, but socializing is a much more difficult
question. Another district court has implied that "interacting with
others" is a major life activity,." 2 but the Eighth Circuit has held that

"caring for others" is not.?

It is easy to see how future courts,

227. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir. 1997)
(en bane) ("We agree that procreation is a fundamental human activity, but are not
certain that it is one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA.").
228. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
229. See id. at 1074.
230. See U
231. See id. at 1081.
232. See Krocka v. Bransfield, 969 F. Supp. 1073, 1083-84 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
233. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996). The
Krauel court's reasoning is, to be charitable, obscure. First, the court noted that caring for
others was not one of the illustrative major life activities listed in the ADA regulations.
See id. The court put great weight on this fact, even though it recognized that the list is
explicitly non-exclusive. See id. Second, the court noted that the plaintiff's alleged
disability "in no way prevented her from performing her full job duties as a respiratory
therapist." Id. Oddly, on this basis, the court went on to "conclude, then, that to treat ...
caring for others as [a] major life activit[y] under the ADA would be inconsistent with the
illustrative list of activities in the regulations, and a considerable stretch of federal law."
Id. The court did not explain why caring for others is inconsistent, but one must expect
obscure reasoning in cases governed by obscure statutory language. Even after Bragdon,
it is hard to formulate concrete legal arguments on this issue because Bragdon commands
the court simply to weigh the relative importance of caring for others in abstract terms.
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2205 (1998).
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following the Bragdon Court's command to weigh the relative
importance of given activities, will continue to rule inconsistently on
such abstract questions.
In addition to growing and socializing, sex-another higherorder human activity-has surfaced in Fourth Circuit case law as a
possible major life activity.'
The Fourth Circuit's holding that
"engaging in intimate sexual relations" is not a major life activitypz
may now be overruled by the words of the Supreme Court in
Bragdon: "Reproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life
activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are
central to the life process itself." 6 The Supreme Court considered
only procreative sex, however; still open is the question of whether
sex that is engaged in for non-procreative reasons is a major life
activity. Whether appellate courts are in a better position than any
other societal body to weigh the relative significance of this type of
activity is also an open question.
Other abstract activities that have presented themselves include
exercising good judgment,237 commuting to work, 23s taking tests,139
and flying in airplanes.2 40 As arguments about major life activities
grow more creative, the case law begins to look more bizarre. For
example, a more mundane activity, lifting, apparently can qualify as
"major" if it involves fifteen pounds or less,2 41 but does not qualify if
234. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1997)
(en bane).
235. See iLat 171.
236. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
237. See Hindman v. GTE Data Servs., Inc., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 WL 371396,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994). In Hindman, the plaintiff suffered from a chemical
imbalance that affected his behavior. See id. The court noted that "personality traits that
are commonplace or characteristics within the 'normal' range are excluded from
protection. However, when poor judgment is a symptom of a mental or psychological
disorder it is defined as an impairment that would qualify as a disability under the ADA."
Id. at *3.
238. See Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 975 F. Supp. 1387, 139091 (D. Kan. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument that commuting was not, as a matter of
law, a major life activity).
239. See Tatum v. N.C.A.A., 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1998). While the
plaintiff had argued that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of test
taking, the Tatum court, in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, did not reach
the issue because it failed to find a likelihood of success on the merits regarding his need
for accommodation. See id.
240. See Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding no basis in the regulations or case law to hold that flying is a major life activity).
241. See Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding a general issue of material fact as to whether the ability to lift more than 15
pounds is substantially limited by the plaintiff's multiple sclerosis); see also 29 C.F.R. pt,
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it involves forty-five pounds or more.242 It is doubtful that Bragdon
will be of any use in helping courts determine when lifting takes on
significance equal to that of hearing, seeing, working, and other
confirmed major life activities. Most courts would probably agree
that universal human functions, such as eating and sleeping,243 pass
Bragdon's test. When the alleged activity is too general, however,
the analysis spins out of control. In addition to growing and
socializing, the plaintiff in Happy Time Day Care Center proposed
that "living" be considered a major life activity.2 4 Only statutory
language as twisted as the ADA's disability definition could prompt a
court to write that "living is not a major life activity."2 45 The Happy
Time Day Care Center court was concerned that "such an expansive
construction ... would likely yield bizarre and unintended results not
far down the road." 4 6 Perhaps the most bizarre aspect of this issue is
simply that the court, under the ADA's text, was even asked to assess
whether "living" was a "major life activity" in the first place.
(2) How Should Courts Determinethe Scope of Allegedly "Major"
Life Activities?
Of course, before courts can assess the relative importance of a
given activity, they must define its scope. In Reeves v. Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc.,247 the Second Circuit feared that
plaintiffs could manipulate the scope of alleged major life activities to
suit their individual cases and that such manipulation would expand
the ADA's coverage beyond the truly disabled:
For example, while it might be hard to show that a very mild
cough substantially limits the major life activity of
"breathing," it would be far easier to make an individualized
showing of a substantial limitation if the major life activity
were instead defined more narrowly as, say, the major life
activity of "breathing atop Mount Everest" .... Narrowing
1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (1998) ("[O]ther major life activities include, but are not limited to,
sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching.").
242. See Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a plaintiff who suffered from a back injury could lift 45 pounds only
occasionally was not limited in a major life activity).
243. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. J.F. Fredericks Tool Co., 964 F. Supp. 616, 621 (D. Conn.
1997) (noting that eating and sleeping are major life activities); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
851 F. Supp. 808,814 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
244. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1074 (W.D.
Wis. 1998).
245. Id. at 1081-82.
246. Id. at 1082.

247. 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
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and diluting the definition of a major life activity, which in
turn might lessen the plaintiff's burden of proving a
substantial limitation, would undermine the role of the
statute's "substantial limit[ation]" inquiry in ensuring that
only impairments of some significance are protected by the
ADA. 48
In Reeves, the plaintiff, who suffered from a panic disorder
coupled with agoraphobia (the fear of being in public places), argued
249
that this condition substantially limited him in "everyday mobility.
Specifically, he defined the term using examples of acts he could not
perform: "taking vacations," "going to a shopping mall alone," and
traveling "along a route which might cause [one] to cross a bridge or
tunnel."" 0 The Second Circuit rejected "everyday mobility," as
defined by the plaintiff, as a major life activity because "[i]f the
courts permit individual tailoring of the scope of the major life
activity, the case-by-case inquiry into whether an impairment entails
a 'substantial limit[ation]' is essentially fixed from the outset-it is, in
short, pre-determined by a plaintiff."z 1 The distrust evident in the
Reeves opinion coincides with society's desire to assist only the "truly
disabled" and to view those with invisible impairments with
suspicion. 2 This distrust, in turn, led the court to overlook the
obvious disability of a man who apparently has severe difficulties
functioning in the modern world.
A rare example of an expansive reading of a major life activity
appears in Happy Time Day Care Center, which addressed the
activity of "caring for oneself." 3 In denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the court held that an inference could be
drawn that the HIV-positive three-year-old plaintiff was substantially
limited in caring for himself because of his body's compromised
248. Id. at 152 (alteration in original).
249. See iL
250. Id. at 153.
251. Id
252- See supra note 150. A case involving a similarly invisible emotional disability is
Calvarese v. Oswego, No. 96-CV-602 (FJS), 1998 WL 315091, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 10,
1998), which was dismissed on summary judgment because the plaintiff was found not
disabled as a matter of law. See id. at *2. While the plaintiff presented evidence that he
had been diagnosed as "emotionally disturbed" as a child and continued to display
aggressive behavior, he had not specified a particular major life activity in which he was
substantially limited. See id The court noted that it "fail[ed] to see" how the plaintiff's
occasional aggression "significantly limits any major life function," id., despite the fact that
the case itself concerned a violent outburst that led to the plaintiff's suspension from an
amateur hockey league, see id. at *1.
253. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 1073, 1074 (W.D. Wis.
1998).
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"ability to fight off common, relatively mild infectious agents without

the need of serious medical intervention."' 54 Other courts, however,
so far have been unwilling to characterize functions at the cellular
level as major life activities.
This refusal is evident in several decisions holding that plaintiffs
with cancer were not disabled 5 5 While such plaintiffs may suffer
from a disease which, if untreated, will destroy their bodies, they
must still demonstrate a limitation in an activity such as working,
walking, or speaking in order to maintain a discrimination suit. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bragdon exhibits a similar line
of thought: plaintiffs should not be able automatically to transform
impairments of various body systems into limitations on major life
activities5 7 Because the Bragdonmajority did not address this issue,
it is unclear whether courts can allow physiological functions to
qualify as major life activities. The regulatory list of illustrative
activities is equally unhelpful on this point because at least one
activity-breathing-is itself a physiological function, but most of the
other activities, such as learning and working, are substantially more
abstract. Further, with regard to sensory functions, the Department
of Justice has opined that using the sense of smell is not a major life
activity,25 although hearing and seeing are specifically listed as such
in the ADA regulations issued by the EEOC and the Department of
Justice.5 9 One can only speculate about touching and tasting.
Because most courts have not accepted physiological functions
as major life activities, plaintiffs with physiological impairments that
have not yet reached the point of substantially limiting their daily
254. Id. at 1081.
255. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff with breast cancer did not have a disability); Hirsch v. National Mall
& Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 981 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (holding that employee with nonHodgkins lymphoma, a form of cancer, who continued to work did not have a disability);
Malewski v. NationsBank of Fla., N.A., 978 F. Supp. 1095,1100-01 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (same).
256. See, e.g., Ellison, 85 F.3d at 190-91 (holding that the plaintiff was not limited in
working when her cancer was controlled through radiation therapy); Hirsch, 989 F. Supp.
at 981-82 (holding that the plaintiff had not met her burden of producing evidence showing
that her deceased spouse had been actually limited or perceived as limited in any major
life activity when the plaintiff's evidence showed only that her spouse had had cancer);
Malewski, 978 F. Supp. at 1100-01 (holding that the plaintiff was not perceived as being
limited in working where her cancer was controlled through radiation therapy).
257. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215-16 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
258. Policy Letter Authored by L. Irene Bowen, Deputy Director, Office on the
Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Dept. of Justice (June 2, 1992), reprintedin 3 Nat'l
Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 1 290 (Apr. 28, 1993).
259. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (1998).
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activities have frequently resorted to "working" as the major life
260
activity upon which to hang their arguments regarding disability.
This tactic makes sense in that many of the cases concern employers
who allegedly fail to provide workplace accommodations or deny the
plaintiffs job opportunities because of their impairments. 61 Many of
these plaintiffs, however, never get to argue that their employers' acts
were motivated by the plaintiffs' impairments because the EEOC and
the courts262 have defined "working" in such a way as to make it
almost impossible to prove the threshold element of disability by
showing a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working. 263 To show such a limitation, a plaintiff must prove
significant restrictions "in the ability to perform either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." 2" Thus,
"working" does not refer to a plaintiff's ability to perform her own
particular job; rather, it refers to broader notions of employability.
Under this interpretation, a qualified plaintiff whose impairment
has interfered with her job performance may have no recourse if her
employer fails to provide a reasonable, low-cost accommodation that
would allow her to perform effectively and then fires her. Unless she
can prove disability by proving that her impairment would limit her
in a broad range of jobs, her case will be thrown out before she can
prove that her employer may have been motivated by disabilityrelated prejudice. Thus, the scope that the courts accord to a given
major life activity can make or break a legitimate discrimination case
at the outset. Because the range of potential major life activities is
unlimited, it is impossible for Congress, the EEOC, the Justice
Department, or the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of every
activity a plaintiff might put at issue. Therefore, possible variations
260. For a discussion of the problems inherent in viewing working as a major life
activity, see generally Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:
Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 107 (1997) (advocating the elimination of working as a major life activity in ADA
analysis). For a discussion of cases in which plaintiffs used "working" as a major life
activity, see infra notes 312-26 and accompanying text.
261. See infra notes 312-26 and 375-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
raising the issue of the major life activity of working.
262. For a discussion of how courts have interpreted the "substantial limitation"
element in relation to the major life activity of working, see infra notes 312-26 and
accompanying text.
263. See Locke, supranote 260, at 135 ("[C]laims in which plaintiffs have only alleged a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working have been almost universally
rejected.").
264. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
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in breadth continue to inject yet another element of uncertainty into
the "major life activity" analysis, even after Bragdon.
(3) Must the Significance of a MajorLife Activity Be Specific to the
Plaintiff?
Finally, the Supreme Court in Bragdon left open the issue of
whether a major life activity must be analyzed in terms of the specific
plaintiff. While Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion answered this
question in the affirmative by seizing on the statutory words "major
life activity of such individual," the majority did not address the
question directly. 265 Although the Bragdon majority discussed the
major life activity of reproduction in general terms rather than in
specific relation to the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, it could do so only
because it was understood that Abbott made a personal, specific
decision not to have children because of her HIV and, therefore, that
reproduction would have been a major life activity in which she
personally would have engaged. Of course, it is also possible that the
generality of the majority's discussion of reproduction indicates that
it does not matter whether the activity would have played a major
role in Sidney Abbott's life; what matters is only that reproduction is
a major part of human life in general. The First Circuit, in deciding
Abbott, noted that an argument based on requiring Sidney Abbott to
prove that reproduction was a major life activity to her personally
was dubious.266 It left open the question of whether such a specific
showing was necessary, however, because it determined that the
record proved substantial limitations in reproduction in both the
general and specific sense. 67
Previous cases involving HIV-infected children have placed the
specificity requirement more directly at issue and have revealed some
absurdities inherent in the "major life activity" test itself. In Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Business & Educational Radio26 a former
employee brought suit against her employer alleging that the
employer terminated her because it feared that her adopted son, who
was HIV-positive but asymptomatic, would contract future illnesses
265. See supranotes 220-25 and accompanying text.
266. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998); see also Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc) ("[Courts need only consider whether the impairment at issue
substantially limits the plaintiff's ability to perform one of the major life activities
contemplated by the ADA, not whether the particular activity that is substantially limited
is important to him.").
267. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
268. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
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that would adversely affect the employer's health insurance rates. 269
Joan Ennis, the plaintiff, based her suit on an ADA provision that
prohibits employers from taking adverse employment action
"because of the known disability of an individual person with whom
the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association.""27 The Fourth Circuit held that Ennis's adopted son
would qualify as "disabled" only if he had an impairment that
substantially limited a life activity that was of particular importance
to him personally. 71 The court noted, however, that the record as to
the boy's limitations in life functions may not have been fully
developed. 272
Because the court was reviewing a grant of summary judgment in
favor of the employer, it assumed that the boy was disabled and
moved on to other dispositive issues.273 Had the court needed to
decide definitively whether Joan Ennis's son was disabled, it is
unclear, even after Bragdon, whether reproduction would have
qualified as a major life activity in this case. Given that Ms. Ennis's
son was a child and therefore unable to father children in any case, it
seems illogical to speak in terms of reproduction being one of his
major life activities that could have been limited at the time the
defendant took its adverse action.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Wisconsin, faced with
a similar fact situation in Happy Time Day Care Center, noted the
absurdity of the question posed by the statutory "disability"
definition: "[T]here is something inherently illogical about inquiring
whether an individual's ability to perform a particular [life] activity is
substantially limited by an external factor when, for entirely
unrelated reasons, this individual is incapable of engaging in that
activity in the first place." 274 Because the case involved a three-yearold child, the court determined that the "correct and more logical
application is to start by identifying those activities that are
important in the life of a three year-old. Procreation does not make
269. See id. at 57.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994); see also Ennis, 53 F.3d at 56-57 (explaining that
Ennis alleged that her employer fired her because of her son's HIV).

271. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59 ("The term 'disability' is specifically defined ... 'with
respect to [the] individual' and the individualized focus is reinforced by the requirement
that the underlying impairment substantially limit a major life activity of the individual."
(alteration in original)).
272. See id. at 60.
273. See id.
274. United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (W.D. Wis.

1998).
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By employing an expansive definition of "caring for

oneself,"276 the court was able to hold that the three-year-old could
indeed be limited in a major life activity.27 7 However, the statutory
language forced the court to go through some impressive gymnastics

in order to reach a perfectly common sense result.2 78
The major life activities cases discussed above do not map out a
consistent scheme of analysis regarding this element of the ADA
definition of disability, and it is doubtful that Bragdon will add

uniformity to future analyses of any of these issues. What the cases
do consistently show is that the statutory definition poses the wrong
questions. After all, under the ADA's disability definition, Sidney
Abbott's routine trip to the dentist eventually led to nine Supreme
Court Justices sitting down to philosophize about the role of
reproduction in human existence. 279
The Bragdon majority
apologized for being "legalistic,"'' "0 but it had no choice, given the

statutory language it had to follow. As three levels of the court
system considered such "legalisms," almost four years passed
between the time Abbott's dentist refused to treat her in his office,
admittedly because of her HIV, and the time she definitively learned
she had the required "disabled" status to bring a discrimination

suit. 1 When such a relatively straightforward case travels such a
long and winding route to an obvious conclusion, one wonders about
the statutory guides that have directed it through such a process. The
statutory "major life activity" language seems a particularly poor
275. Id. The court cited Knapp v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 479-80 (7th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997), for the proposition that "major life
activities" should be defined in an individualized manner during the "substantial
limitation" analysis. See Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; see also
Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 2 F. Supp. 2d 388, 393-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(applying an individualized analysis and holding that "working" could be a major life
activity of a law school graduate who had not yet passed the bar examination, even if it
was not a major life activity of medical students who had not yet finished their studies),
aff'd in partand vacated in part,156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998).
276. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
277. See Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
27& See id. at 1080-81.
279. In this role, the Justices were not unlike the eighteenth-century philosophers who
sought to identify those activities that properly define human existence. See supra note
145.
280. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2205 (1998).
281. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the First Circuit to determine whether
the defendant had presented evidence raising a factual issue as to whether Abbott's HIV
would pose a direct threat to him were he to fill her cavity in his office. See id at 2213.
On remand, the First Circuit examined the direct threat issue and reaffirmed its holding of
summary judgment in favor of Abbott. See Bragdon v. Abbott, No. 96-1643, 1998 WL
887125 (1st Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
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guide in discrimination cases.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the "Substantially Limits" Element
a. Supreme Court Guidance from Bragdon v. Abbott
After determining that reproduction was a major life activity, the
Supreme Court in Bragdon went on to examine whether the
In short, the
plaintiff's HIV substantially limited this activity.
Court held that when the plaintiff's impairment makes a particular
activity dangerous to the plaintiff or to others, and the plaintiff
therefore reasonably decides to refrain from the activity, the
impairment has "substantially limited" that activity. 283 More
specifically, the Court noted medical research indicating that the
male sexual partner of a woman with HIV runs a "statistically
significant risk" of contracting the infection. 284 It also noted that
women with HIV face approximately a 20% risk of transmitting the
virus to their children 85 The Court concluded, therefore, that
"[c]onception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim
but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health. This meets
the definition of a substantial limitation."' 2s6 The Court rejected the
argument that the limitation could be discounted as a voluntary
response on the part of the plaintiff, rather than an inherent
restriction imposed by the impairment itself.' s Citing a 1988 opinion
from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, the
Court noted that "[t]he limitation ... was the infection's manifest

physical effect." 2 The majority recognized a self-imposed limitation
as reasonable in Bragdon because "HIV-infected individuals cannot,
whether they are male or female, engage in the act of procreation
with the normal expectation of bringing forth a healthy child." 289
In dicta, the majority also noted that it had "little doubt that had

282. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205-07.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 2206. The Court cited a 1994 textbook on AIDS that collected 13 studies the
cumulative results of which indicated that "20% of male partners of women with HIV
became HIV-positive themselves." Id. (citing Dennis H. Osmand & Nancy Padian, Sexual
Transmission of HIV, in THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.9-8 & tbl.2 (P.T. Cohen et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1994)).
285. See id.

286. Id
287. See id. at 2207.
288. Id. (citing Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected
Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264,264-65 (1988)).
289. Id. (citing 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 273).
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different parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an
HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life
activities" as well. 90 This comment implies that the Court is willing
to interpret the idea of substantial limitations rather broadly to
include not only present restrictions but also future restrictions that
may arise as a disease progresses. Justice Ginsburg interpreted the
element even more broadly in her own opinion, noting that HIV has
been regarded as "limiting life itself" and that it "affects the need for
and, as this case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of
the reaction of others to the impairment." 91 Her opinion implied,
but did not specify, that the way in which HIV affects the availability
of heath care is a substantial limitation. In addition, Justice Ginsburg
specifically considered the disease in all its present and future stages,
allowing her to take into account potential limitations
in family
29
relations, employment potential, and caring for oneself.
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed the concept of
limitation much more narrowly, and his analysis was much more
closely tied to the literal language of the ADA. He equated
"substantial limitation" with compromised physical ability.2 93
Therefore, he determined that "[w]hile individuals infected with HIV
may choose not to engage in [procreation and child rearing], there is
no support in language, logic, or our case law for the proposition that
such voluntary choices constitute a 'limit' on one's own life
activities. 2 94 His interpretation of the definition would require the
plaintiff to show that her HIV made her physically less able to
reproduce 95 In addition, it would consider only those physical
restrictions that the plaintiff was experiencing at the time of the
alleged discrimination: "[T]he ADA's definition of a disability is met
only if the alleged impairment substantially 'limits' (present tense) a
major life activity. Asymptomatic HIV does not presently limit
respondent's ability to perform any of the tasks necessary to bear or
raise a child. 2 96 Sidney Abbott contended that her disease would

290. Id. at 2205. The Court cited with approval, but did not specifically adopt, the
EEOC's categorical conclusion that "an individual who has HIV infection (including
asymptomatic HIV infection) is an individual with a disability." Id. at 2209 (citing 2
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902.4(c)(1), at 35 (Mar. 1995)).
291. Id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
292- See id at 2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
293. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
294. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
295. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
296. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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make it unlikely that she would "'live long enough to raise and
nurture [a] child to adulthood.' ,29
However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist responded that this argument, "taken to its logical
extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for
some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some
possible future effects." 298
b.

Questions Remaining for the Lower Courts
(1) How SubstantialMust a "Substantial"Limit Be?

While the Court in Bragdon clarified that a substantial limitation
on a major life activity can stem from a plaintiff's reasonable
response to a threat posed by an impairment, the opinion does little
to clarify the degree to which an activity must be limited when the
connection between the impairment and the restriction is more
direct. A number of courts have used the "substantial limitation"
requirement as a fine screen to filter out cases brought by plaintiffs
with all but the most serious mental and physical disorders. 299
Although such a narrow reading of the requirement appears
inconsistent with legislative intent, 0 there is nothing in the statute or
regulations 0 1 to prevent the courts from following this course. A
sampling of representative cases illustrates the problem.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for
example, held that a plaintiff was not disabled despite the fact that he
had muscle weakness, residual partial paralysis from polio, one leg
longer than the other, and an approximate total body impairment of
fifteen percent.3 ° The court reasoned that "[a]lthough plaintiff
297. See idL (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Brief for the Respondent Sidney Abbott at 22, Bragdon (No. 97-156)).
298. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
299. See generallyBurgdorf, supra note 11 (criticizing the narrow interpretation of this
element, which allows courts to dismiss disability suits summarily before plaintiffs can
present evidence regarding the allegedly discriminatory conduct of defendants).
300. Congress deliberately defined "disability" broadly. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 51-54 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-35. As to the "regarded as"
prong, legislative history indicates that an employee should be covered "whether or not
the employer's perception was shared by others in the field." Id., pt. 3, at 30, reprintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453.
301. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998) (defining "substantially limits" as "[u]nable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform" or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular life activity").
302. See Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., No. 94-2669, 1995 WL 368473, at *1 (E.D. La.
June 20, 1995).
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cannot walk briskly, and has some trouble climbing stairs,... his
ability to walk is not substantially limited nor significantly
3 3 The Sixth Circuit recently came to a similar conclusion
restricted.""
regarding a plaintiff whose shoulder and back injuries left him unable
to perform
his job as a deliveryman and, sometimes, to walk without
4

pain.3

With respect to the major life activity of seeing, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that a
plaintiff was not actually substantially limited, despite a brain tumor
behind his right eye that caused him to experience double and
sometimes triple vision.305 The court emphasized that in applying the
ADA's disability definition, courts must take a "pragmatic, factintensive look at each plaintiff. ' 30 6 Ironically, the court praised the
plaintiff for being able "to overcome his impairment admirably" by
adjusting his line of vision, while at the same time holding that he did
not satisfy the first prong of the disability definition.3 °
With respect to another activity-breathing-the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that a plaintiff with
multiple chemical sensitivities had raised a factual issue as to whether
she was substantially limited, but the court also noted that
"defendants' evidence may fairly be said to strongly counter certain
evidence plaintiff submits" on this issue. 0 The plaintiff's sensitivities
caused her to suffer severe reactions at work, where she was exposed
to a variety of chemicals that did not affect other people.30 9 During
one episode, she felt "as if her airway was 'closing off,' ... she was
'
light-headed and faint, and ... she began 'sinking' to the floor. 310
She had to be removed from her workplace in a wheelchair and taken
311
to a doctor's office.

303. Id at *4.
304. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Kelly
v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff with severe posttraumatic degenerative joint disease, which caused him to walk slowly, especially when
climbing stairs, was not substantially limited in walking).
305. See Overturf v. Penn Ventilator Co., 929 F. Supp. 895,898 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
306. Id. at 897.
307. Id. at 898. In the end, however, the court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had raised a factual issue as to whether he
had been regarded as disabled under the third prong of the disability definition. See id. at
899.
308. Treadwell v. Dow-United Techs., 970 F. Supp. 962,972 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
309. See id. at 965.
310. Id. at 971.
311. See id.
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(2) What Does It Mean to Be "SubstantiallyLimited" in Working?
The major life activity of working presents a unique dilemma
with respect to the "substantially limited" requirement.312 Because
the notion of working has been equated with general employability
rather than with performing a particular job,313 courts, following
regulations promulgated by the EEOC,314 have held that substantially

315
limited in working means broadly limited in a wide range of jobs.
Thus, even an impairment that severely restricts a person from
performing one job-or a narrow, specialized class of jobs-will not
substantially limit that person in the major life activity of working.
While this application of the "substantial limitation" element has
been roundly criticized, 3 6 it is well-entrenched in the case law.
Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 7 for example, concerned a
welder who was unable to climb due to a permanent injury to her
arm.31 8 She filed suit against her employer under the ADA after her
employer informed her that it could no longer employ her due to this
restriction. 31 9 The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
employer, holding that the welder was not disabled because she was
not substantially limited in working.3 0
Specifically, the court
required the plaintiff to present "evidence that her disability prevents

312. For a detailed discussion of judicial and administrative analyses of limitations in
working, see Locke, supranote 260, at 115-31.
313. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
314. EEOC regulations state:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1998).
315. See infranotes 317-26 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating When a Person Is
Substantially Limited in Her Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203, 235-42 (1993)
(criticizing courts' application of the one-job-is-not-enough rule under the Rehabilitation
Act as imposing an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and leading to illogical, inequitable
results); Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 439-69 (criticizing the one-job-is-not-enough rule in
decisions under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA); Locke, supra note 260, at 116
(criticizing as inequitable the burden placed upon ADA plaintiffs who must prove general
limitations in employability); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act
Interpretingthe Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases,2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-6
(1992) (criticizing the inconsistent results arising from the ADA regulations regarding
substantial limitations in working).
317. 53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
318. See id. at 725.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 727.
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her from performing an entire class of jobs."32' Because the plaintiff
showed only that she was limited in welding positions that required

climbing, she did not meet this requirement.322 Other circuit courts
addressing similar issues are in agreement that a substantial
limitation in working must involve more than a restriction affecting a
single, specialized job.3' This interpretation, however, inequitably
rewards employers who are the first to discriminate or who impose

aberrant qualification criteria.324 It also imposes an unreasonable
burden on the plaintiff, who must muster detailed demographic
evidence regarding other available jobs.3' Most important, it ignores
the impact of the loss of the job of one's choice, which is surely a
"substantial limitation." 326
A final illogical quirk that has arisen with respect to the
"substantially limits" element is the allowance of facts indicating an
ability to perform a particular job to negate showings of inability with
respect to other major life activities. At least two district courts have
taken this course. In Overturf v. Penn Ventilator Co.,327 for example,
the plaintiff argued that he was substantially limited in his ability to
see. 328 The court bolstered its failure to find an actual limitation in
seeing by noting the plaintiff's testimony "that his impairment never
kept him from performing all of the tasks of his job."329 Further, in
Stone v. Entergy Services, Inc.,3 ° the plaintiff argued that residual
partial paralysis from polio, among other problems, substantially
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996); Holihan
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997);
Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996); Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994). One district court allowed a plaintiff to
get around the "single job" rule by giving the plaintiff's individual restrictions a heavy
cumulative weight. In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Ind.
1995), affd, 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997), the plaintiff
argued that his epilepsy prevented him from climbing stairs and working night shifts. See
id. at 1399. The court, noting that "the test for substantial limitation encompasses nonwork activities as well," held that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the plaintiff's
disabled status, although it did not list specific other activities in which the plaintiff was
limited. Id. In addition, in ruling on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the
court put the burden on the defendant to show that other jobs existed that the plaintiff
could perform. See id. at 1400.
324. See Bales, supranote 316, at 237, 240.
325. See id. at 239-40.
326. See id. at 241-42.
327. 929 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
328. See id. at 898.
329. Id.
330. No. 94-2669, 1995 WL 368473, at *1 (E.D. La. June 20, 1995).
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limited his ability to walk. 331 The Stone court similarly relied on
"plaintiff's ability to work" in finding that he was not disabled, even
though he did indeed have difficulty walking.332
(3) Are Impairments "SubstantiallyLimiting" If They Are Controlled
Through MitigatingMeasures?
Another open question regarding the "substantially limits"
element concerns whether courts may take treatments and other
mitigating measures into account when deciding whether a given
impairment substantially limits a given major life activity. While the
defendant in Bragdon argued that the limits imposed by the
plaintiff's HIV should be weighed in light of new medications that
can lower the risk of perinatal transmission, the Court specifically
refrained from deciding whether such consideration was proper.333
Because the medication would lower the risk of transmission from
twenty-five percent to eight percent, the Court noted that a
substantial limit existed in either case.3 4
Cases in the lower courts have raised the question more
pointedly, however, and judicial interpretation is divided. While
legislative history335 and interpretative guidance from the
Department of Justice 336 and EEOC 337 indicate that the availability of
mitigating treatments should not count in the evaluation of the
"substantial limitation" element, some courts have refused to follow
this guidance.33 The Tenth Circuit, for example, held in Sutton v.
United Airlines339 that this portion of the interpretive guidance "is in
direct conflict with the plain language of the ADA.... In making
disability determinations, we are concerned with whether the
impairment affects the individual in fact, not whether it would
hypothetically affect the individual without the use of corrective

331. See id. at *3.
331 See id *4.
333. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2206 (1998).
334. See id.
335. See H.R. REP.No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334 ("Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures....").
336. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A § 35.104 (1998); id. pt. 36, app. B. § 36.104 (1998).
337. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
338. Courts, of course, are not bound to follow interpretive rules, which do not have
the force of law. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind
Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 55-58 (1990) (noting that courts should not
presumptively follow agency guidelines and interpretive rules).
339. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
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measures."" The Sutton case concerned twin sisters who had been
denied jobs as pilots with United because of their uncorrected visual
impairment of 20/200 vision in their right eyes and 20/400 vision in
their left eyes.3 41 With glasses, both plaintiffs had 20/20 vision. 344 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for United, reading the
words "substantially limits" very literally and determining that the
plaintiffs were not substantially limited in their ability to see:
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They are either disabled
because their uncorrected vision substantially restricts their
major [life] activity of seeing and, thus, they are not
qualified individuals for a pilot position with United, or they
are qualified for the position because their vision is
correctable and does not substantially limit their major life
activity of seeing.M3
This interpretation creates, as one commentator has observed, a
catch-22 situation for plaintiffs." 4 In order to prevail, plaintiffs must
prove not only a substantial limitation but also must prove that they
are qualified for the job opportunities or services that defendants
have denied them. Thus, even a severely disabled plaintiff who can
perform a job exceptionally well with reasonable accommodations
may have no recourse if an employer refuses to hire her because of
her disability. Under the Tenth Circuit's view, the accommodations
may prevent her from being "disabled" and would therefore prevent
the court from ever reaching the issue of whether the employer's
rejection of the plaintiff made sense. Unfortunately, one other circuit
court has noted that it will follow the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, at
least in cases involving less severe impairments. The Fifth Circuit has
stated that it will read narrowly the EEOC guidelines regarding
mitigating measures and will consider mitigating measures in its
disability analysis, except in cases involving "serious impairments and
ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC
Guidelines and the legislative history-diabetes, epilepsy, and
hearing impairments."' 4 Other circuit courts, however, have held
expressly that an evaluation of substantial limitations must not take

340. 1L at 902.
341. See id at 895.
342. See id.
343. Id. at 903.
344. See Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 448; see also Employers Win, supra note 8, at 405
(attributing the low victory rate (14%) of plaintiffs in administrative and judicial ADA
matters to the catch-22 situation inherent in the statute).
345. Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d 464,470 (5th Cir. 1998).
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mitigating measures into account. 46
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
has developed a particularly unusual approach to this issue. In
Happy Time Day Care Center, the court decided to disregard "the
alphabet soup of medication responsible for stabilizing [the
plaintiff's] T cell count."' 7 This determination was in contrast to its
decision in an earlier case, in which it had considered the effects of
insulin in reducing limitations posed by the plaintiff's diabetes.34
The Happy Time Day Care Center court reconciled its decision with
the earlier case by noting that "[u]nlike diabetes and insulin, the
medication available to [the plaintiff] and others infected by HIV has
no proven long term effectiveness and may become useless if a
resistant form of the virus develops."' 9 This sliding scale approach is
creative but still does not alleviate the catch-22 situation in cases in
which effective medication is available. In fact, as HIV research
becomes more promising, it is possible that the sliding scale approach
will begin to take antiviral medication into account, thus prohibiting
many HIV-infected plaintiffs from bringing suit even if HIV-based
discrimination continues.
This result would be particularly
unfortunate given that prejudices and misconceptions regarding HIV
may well prove to be more stubborn than the virus itself.
In the end, any consideration of mitigating measures in the
evaluation of substantial limitations thwarts the purposes of the
ADA. The impairment-based discrimination that the ADA seeks to
prohibit can occur even when mitigating measures are in place, as
when an employer, relying unreasonably on myths and stereotypes,
denies a job opportunity to a person with diabetes whose disease is
controlled through insulin. Sometimes the mitigating measures
themselves may generate fear and discrimination, as when a person
who uses a prosthetic device is denied an opportunity because others
fear it or find it unsightly. If a court finds that insulin or a prosthetic
device alleviates functional limitations and renders such plaintiffs not
346. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d
Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid Beverage Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v.
United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,
627-28 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting
Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997).
347. United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (W.D. Wis.
1998).
348. See Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
349. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
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disabled, then these plaintiffs will never have a chance to present
arguments as to the defendants' unreasonable, discriminatory
conduct-the precise harm that the ADA was meant to prohibit.
(4) When Must ImpairmentsBe "SubstantiallyLimiting"?
One final issue regarding the substantial limitation element left
open by Bragdon concerns the time frame in which such limitations
are in effect. While the majority in Bragdon held that the plaintiff
was disabled due to her current risk of transmitting her disease to a
sexual partner or an unborn child,351 it is unclear whether the same
analysis would apply in the case of an HIV-infected child who may
run these risks at some unspecified time in the future. Chief Justice
Rehnquist placed significance on the fact that the words
"substantially limits," as they appear in the ADA's disability
definition, are in the present tense.35' This view is consistent with
lower court opinions holding that plaintiffs suffering from terminal
diseases are not disabled unless the disease presently limits a major
life activity.352 In one such case, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, analyzing the substantial limitation
element under the "regarded as" prong of the definition, rejected the
plaintiff's contention that her husband's employer regarded him as
disabled because it knew of his cancer, which did not substantially
limit him at the time.35 3 According to the court, "such reasoning
would lead to the conclusion that any employee who informed his
employer that he suffered from a life-threatening or terminal disease
would become 'disabled' for purposes of the ADA. '354 The court
therefore required the plaintiff to "produce evidence that the
employer viewed the employee as someone who had a disability that
seriously limited his ability to work. '355 After reviewing this analysis,
one has to wonder who can qualify as disabled if those who suffer
from life-threatening, and even terminal, diseases do not.
350. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that plaintiff with breast cancer was not disabled where she was able to work);
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
that evidence would have to show that child with HIV currently was limited in a major life
activity in order for him to be deemed disabled); Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989
F. Supp. 977, 981 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff's husband, who had nonHodgkins lymphoma, "a serious and ultimately terminal form of cancer," was not disabled
at the time of his termination because he was able to work despite his disease).
353. See Hirsch, 989 F. Supp. at 982.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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Some courts, however, have factored future limitations into their
analyses of the substantial limitation element. In Lee v. Trustees of
Dartmouth College,55 the plaintiff was terminated from a medical
residency program in neurosurgery when the defendants learned that
he suffered neurological symptoms that may have been consistent
with the onset of multiple sclerosis, a degenerative neurological
disease. 7
While no evidence indicated that the symptoms
substantially limited the plaintiff at the time of his termination, the
court held that the plaintiff had raised a factual issue as to whether he
was disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the definition.3 8 The
court reasoned that because the evidence indicated that the
defendants regarded the plaintiff as having multiple sclerosis, "a trier
of fact could find that defendants perceived [the plaintiff's]
neurological symptoms as substantially limiting (or potentially
limiting) his ability to learn ... and/or to perform the necessary
manual tasks needed in surgery."3 59 The court also noted that the
defendants feared that the plaintiff "would deteriorate and be unable
36
to complete the [residency] program.""
This analysis correctly accounts for the harm caused by myths
and fears regarding disabilities and their possible future effects.
However, it does finesse the literal language of the definition, which
describes substantial limitations in the present tense. As noted
previously,361 some courts are less comfortable departing from rigid
readings of the statutory language. Therefore, as long as the
statutory text remains unchanged, defendants in some jurisdictions
will be able to discriminate with impunity against people whose
diseases do not pose present restrictions but do pose serious threats
of future harm.
356. 958 F. Supp. 37 (D.N.H. 1997).
357. See id. at 39 & n.2.
358. See id. at 43.

359. Id. (emphasis added).
360. Id.
361. See supra notes 338-46 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist described
a slippery slope that courts create when they decide to take future limitations into account:
"Respondent's argument, taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with
a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some
possible future effects." Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2216 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Mark S. Dichter &
Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 42 VILL. L. REv. 613, 633 (1997)

(recommending that courts not expand the ADA disability definition to cover people with
genetic markers for particular diseases because they may never get these diseases and
because other state and federal legislation already protects against discrimination based
on genetic information).
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3. Judicial Interpretation of the "Record of" and "Regarded as"

Prongs
The "record of such an impairment" element of the ADA's
disability definition, 362 which appears as the second prong of the

three-prong test, is the least litigated of the three. 63 It comes into
play only when a plaintiff is unable to prove a real or perceived
current substantial limitation.3 4 When plaintiffs do rely on this
prong, they run up against the same hurdles inherent in the first
prong because the words "such an impairment" refer to an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, as described

in the first prong.3 65 Therefore, under the "record of" prong, the

recorded impairment must have substantially limited a major life
activity at some time in the past, even if it no longer does so. 3 66 When

courts take mitigating treatments into account during their analyses
of the substantial limitation element, even plaintiffs who have
experienced serious impairments may fail to satisfy the "record of"
prong. Thus, in Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 67 a plaintiff who

had had a lumpectomy and daily radiation treatments for six weeks to
treat breast cancer could not show a record of an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity because she had continued

to work on a modified schedule throughout her treatment, and
because

her

treatment

eventually

allowed

her

to

recover

completely.316
362. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
363. My own research for this Article turned up far fewer cases under this prong than
under the other two prongs of the definition.
364. See, e.g., Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the plaintiffs evidence regarding limitations that her attention deficit
disorder had posed during her school days had raised a factual issue as to whether she had
a record of disability, even though the disorder did not presently limit her in her work, and
her employer did not regard her as presently limited).
365. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
366. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1998) ("Has a record of such impairment means has a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities."); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(1)(iii)(3),
36.104(1)(iv)(3) (1998) (same).
367. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
368. See id. at 192. This interpretation follows legislative intent insofar as it requires
recorded impairments to have been substantially limiting. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 52 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (stating that the "record of' prong
covers "individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental impairment which
previously substantially limited them in a major life activity"). It is doubtful, however,
that Congress intended courts to factor in specific mitigating treatments when assessing
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The "regarded as" prong of the disability definition has posed
more complex interpretative questions to the courts. A key issue is
whether a plaintiff with a real impairment literally must be regarded

as substantially limited in a major life activity or whether she need
merely be subjected to one episode of prejudice based on the
impairment in order to qualify under the "regarded as" prong. The
ADA regulations state that someone can qualify as "disabled" under
this prong if the person is impaired and the impairment is perceived
as substantially limiting, or if the impairment is actually substantially

limiting, but only as a result of the attitudes of others toward the
impairment. 69 One commentator has noted that the second
interpretation strains the statutory language, which speaks in terms of
direct causation between the impairment and the limitation, even
with respect to the "regarded as" prong.3 70 Another commentator
has suggested that this interpretation, if read literally, adds nothing to
the "actual disability" prong of the definition because an impairment
that causes substantial limitations due to societal attitudes is still a

substantially limiting impairment that should qualify under the first
prong.371 Nevertheless, however broadly or narrowly one reads the
statutory "regarded as" prong, this interpretation-the so-called
"attitudinal" regulation 372-is presumably a valid construction of the

statute.73
Under a literal reading of the two regulatory interpretations, a
plaintiff runs into the same problems proving substantial limitations

past limitations. See supra note 335; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389 (noting that the "record of" prong in the
Rehabilitation Act covers "persons who have recovered-in whole or in part-from a
handicapping condition, such as ... cancer"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (noting
that the "record of" prong of the ADA "protects former cancer patients from
discrimination based on their prior medical history"). The use of the conditional in the
EEOC's Interpretative Guidance on this point is instructive: "The impairment indicated
in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the
individual's major life activities." Id. (emphasis added).
369. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(2). This language is
taken from the legislative history of the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335. The regulations also state that a plaintiff can
qualify as disabled under the "regarded as" prong if she has no impairment at all but is
treated as if she had a substantially limiting impairment. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104;
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()(3).
370. See Buss, supra note 167, at 1431.
371. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regardfor the "RegardedAs" Prong: Giving
Effect to CongressionalIntent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 597 (1997).
372. See Buss, supra note 167, at 1431 (describing an identically worded regulation
under the Rehabilitation Act, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(iv)(B) (1991)).
373. See supra note 165.
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as he would under the first prong of the definition. 374 When the
alleged major life activity is working, such a showing can be

particularly difficult, given the broad-based lack of employability that
the plaintiff must demonstrate. 375

An early Fourth Circuit case

decided under identical language in the Rehabilitation Act, Forrisiv.
Bowen,376 illustrates this difficulty. In Forrisi, a utility systems
repairer was fired because his employer claimed that his acrophobia

(fear of heights) rendered him unable to climb ladders, a necessary
part of the job.377 Although the plaintiff argued that he had been

regarded as disabled under the third prong of the disability
definition, the court disagreed, holding that the employer had not

perceived him as substantially limited in working but only as
"unsuited for one position in one plant-and nothing more."378
Because the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
employer, the plaintiff never had the opportunity to present evidence
regarding

the

possibility

of

the

employer

"adjustments to accommodate his fears."379

making

specific

At least four other

circuits have placed the same burden on plaintiffs who raised the

issue of substantial limitations in working under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA.8
The narrow reading of this statutory prong and its two regulatory
interpretations discussed above can lead to egregious results. In
Ellison, for example, the plaintiff's "regarded as" argument was
based upon several comments that her employer made concerning
her breast cancer and lumpectomy. 38 ' During a meeting in which
supervisors discussed a departmental staff reduction, a human
resources official asked whether any employees had special
The plaintiff's supervisor
circumstances to be considered.m
374. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (defining "substantially limits" as "[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform" or
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular life activity"); see also supra notes 299-361 and
accompanying text (illustrating the difficulty courts have had in applying the regulatory
interpretations of "substantially limits").
375. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
376. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
377. See id. at 933.
378. Id. at 935.
379. Id. at 931.
380. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hamm, 100 F.3d 907, 913 (11th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58
F.3d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1995); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727-28 (5th
Cir. 1995).
381. See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1996).
382. See id. at 193.
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responded that "Phyllis [the plaintiff] has cancer."383 Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff and three of her thirty-four departmental
colleagues were informed that they had thirty days to find other
positions in the company or leave.3 4 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
did not determine this evidence to be sufficient to defeat summary
judgment for the employer because the plaintiff, as the highest
ranked of the four affected employees, was offered and accepted a
lower paying position within the company when an opening
385
occurred.

In addition, the court held that a series of derogatory comments
made by the plaintiff's supervisor did not raise a factual issue as to
her qualification under the "regarded as" prong.386 These comments
included his suggestion that the plaintiff have a mastectomy rather
than a lumpectomy because her breasts were not worth saving, his
remark that her nausea following radiation therapy had not affected
her weight, and his joking suggestion that employees evacuating the
building during a power outage follow the plaintiff because she
glowed.3 7 While the court condemned these comments as "beneath
contempt," it held that they failed to create an issue of material fact
as to "whether [the employer] regarded Ellison as having a
substantially limiting impairment, '38 primarily because the
comments failed to indicate that the employer believed that the
plaintiff's impairment "foreclose[d] generally the type of
39
employment involved."
Similar prejudicial sentiment by an employer is evident in a case
described by Arlene Mayerson in which she represented a man who
wore a hearing aid. 390 The defendant "freely admitted that the reason
the plaintiff was not hired was because he wore a hearing aid."39'
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the case on summary judgment,
apparently finding that the hearing aid prevented the plaintiff from
being actually limited under the first prong of the disability

383. Id.
384. See id. at 189.
385. See id. at 193.
386. See id. at 192-93.
387. See id. The first comment is based upon prejudices involving both sex and
disability. For an insightful discussion of the nexus between sex discrimination and
disability discrimination, see generally Elizabeth R. OuYang, Women with Disabilitiesin
the Work Force: Outlookfor the 1990's, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 13 (1990).
38& Ellison, 85 F.3d. at 193.
389. Id. at 192.
390. See Mayerson, supra note 371, at 592-93.
391. Id. at 593.
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definition, and also finding that the defendant did not regard the
plaintiff as being actually substantially limited under the third
prong.3" In addition, the court must have found that the plaintiff's
rejection from one job, as a result of an employer's negative attitude
toward his hearing aid, did not substantially limit him in working. 93
It is doubtful that Congress intended such results, despite their
conformity to the rigid language of the "regarded as" prong.
Legislative history regarding the ADA clearly states that a plaintiff
qualifies for coverage under the "regarded as" test if the person "is
disqualified on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental
condition, and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-related
reason for the rejection, [because] a perceived concern about
employing persons with disabilities could be inferred."3 94 The
legislative history also specifies that "[a] person who is excluded from
any basic life activity, or is otherwise discriminatedagainst,because of
a covered entity's negative attitudes toward that person's impairment
is treated as having a disability,"3 95 and that a person who is rejected
from a job due to myths, fears, and stereotypes regarding disabilities
is covered by the "regarded as" prong "whether or not the
employer's perception was shared by others in the field."3 96 These
standards would certainly lead to a different result in the hearing aid
case, as well as in Ellison and other cases dismissed on summary
judgment before plaintiffs had an opportunity to present evidence
regarding their employers' motivations. Instead, these cases have
held that analysis of motivations is foreclosed unless the defendant's
negative attitude is so prevalent throughout society that it actually

392. See id. at 592-93. For a critical discussion of opinions that take account of
mitigating measures such as hearing aids when evaluating the substantial limitation
element, see supra notes 333-49 and accompanying text.
393. For a list of cases holding that rejection from one job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in working, see supra note 323.
394. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A § 35.104 (1998) (noting that if a public entity refuses
admittance to someone because of an impairment and can articulate no legitimate reason
for doing so, the person would qualify under the "regarded as" prong); id. pt. 36, app. B.
§ 36.104 (1998) (noting that if a public accommodation refuses service to someone because
of an impairment and can articulate no legitimate reason for doing so, the person would
qualify under the regarded as prong).
395. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335
(emphasis added); see also S.REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) ("A person who is excluded
from any activity covered under this Act or is otherwise discriminated against because of a
covered entity's negative attitude toward disability is being treated as having a disability

which affects a major life activity.").
396. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453.
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constitutes a substantial limitation to the plaintiff a97 or if the
defendant believes that the attitude is so prevalent as to constitute a
substantial limitation.9 8
When viewed in isolation, illustrations of the "regarded as"
prong found in the legislative history give some support to these
holdings. For example, in describing individuals considered to be
"regarded as" disabled, a House Report speaks of persons with scars
from severe burns who may be "viewed by others as having an
impairment which substantially limits some major life activity (e.g.,
working or eating in a restaurant) and are discriminated against on
that basis. ' 399 The illustration does not address whether one incident
of discrimination against such persons, based simply on negative
reactions to the scars, would qualify them as disabled under the
"regarded as" prong. Similarly, a second example speaks of an
employer refusing to hire someone "because of a fear of the 'negative
reactions' of others to the individual."4 ' Again, the example stops
short of explaining whether the employer's own negative reaction is
enough to make the rejected employee "regarded as" disabled.
Further, the same report cites School Board v. Arline4 0' Doe v.
Centinela Hospital," and Thornhill v. Marsh, °3 three Rehabilitation
Act cases, as illustrating proper applications of the "regarded as"
prong. °4 None of these cases concerned a simple negative reaction to
an impairment, however. The Arline plaintiff was held to be disabled
397. This scenario would fulfill the regulatory requirement that the impairment be
substantially limiting as the result of the attitudes of others. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104,
36.104; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()(2) (1998). Ironically, this requirement means that a plaintiff
has no recourse against a defendant whose decision criteria are unusually prejudicial.
398. This situation would fulfill the requirement that the defendant believe the
impairment to be substantially limiting. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(0(1).
399. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335.
400. Id.
401. 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1986) (holding that by including persons "who are actually
physically impaired" and persons "who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment").
402. No. CV87-2514 PAR (PX), 1988 WL 81776, at "1, *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988)
(holding that where the defendant excluded the plaintiff from one rehabilitation program
due to the plaintiff's MIV-positive status, the defendant had treated the plaintiff's
impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity, and the plaintiff therefore had
been "regarded as" disabled).
403. 866 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a factual issue as to the plaintiff's
disability status existed when the defendant believed that the plaintiff was substantially
limited in lifting due to a congenital spinal abnormality).
404. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53-54, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 336.
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because her previous hospitalization for tuberculosis created a record
of an impairment that had substantially limited her major life
activities, in accordance with the second prong of the disability
definition. 5 When discussing the "regarded as" prong in Arline,
Justice Brennan never directly addressed whether a single negative
4 6
reaction to an impairment could qualify a plaintiff as disabled. 1
Further, the courts in both Centinela and Thornhill noted that both
plaintiffs had been specifically regarded as substantially limited in
major life activities, although both courts interpreted the substantial
limitation element somewhat broadly.4°7 Thus, neither case dealt
with the ramifications of a single negative reaction.
The EEOC regulations and interpretative guidance, perhaps
based upon these illustrations, do not allow for the qualification of a
plaintiff under the "regarded as" prong based upon a single negative
reaction.4 0° The EEOC Interpretive Guidance states that if a plaintiff
can show that an employer made a decision because of "a perception
of disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the individual will
satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the definition of disability."4 09 The
first use of the word "disability" in this quotation implies that the
employer must not merely react negatively to the impairment but
must perceive it as a disability-that is, an impairment substantially
limiting a major life activity. While this interpretation squares with
the illustrations described in the ADA's legislative history and with
the literal wording of the statutory "regarded as" prong, it seems at
cross purposes with the broader protections intended to be offered by
the ADA 410 and with other language in the legislative history that
discusses negative reactions more directly.4 '
Further, an interpretation that does not allow recourse to those
405. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
406. See id. at 284. Justice Brennan's opinion speaks only in terms of "those who are
regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life

activity." Id.
407. See Thornhill, 866 F.2d at 1184 (deciding that a factual issue existed as to whether
the defendant had regarded the plaintiffs spinal abnormality as substantially limiting the
plaintiff in lifting where the defendant's physician had reported that the plaintiff should
not lift more than 25 to 50 pounds); Centinela, 1988 WL 81776, at *7 (deciding that the
plaintiff, who was completely excluded from one rehabilitation program due to his HIV,
had been regarded as substantially limited in learning because the defendant had produced
no evidence that other treatment programs would not disfavor the plaintiff on the same

basis).
408.
409.
410.
411.

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2() (1998).
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 394-96 and accompanying text.
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who have been refused opportunities on the basis of their mental and
physical impairments does not make sense. If the goal of the ADA is
to allow those who are qualified to participate in society by working
and using public accommodations and programs, there is no reason to
let a single defendant prevent such participation because of his
personal negative reaction to a plaintiffs impairment-an
impairment that may not prevent the plaintiff from being qualified to
participate at all. If a single episode of discrimination were held
sufficient to qualify a plaintiff as disabled, Bragdon would have been
the easy case it should have been from the beginning. The district
court could have sped nimbly through the issue of the plaintiff's
disabled status and focused immediately on the real issue: whether
the defendant had a legitimate reason to treat the HIV-infected
plaintiff differently from other plaintiffs because her HIV posed a
direct threat. Because the "regarded as" prong has been interpreted
so narrowly, however, its application to the Bragdon facts was
doubtful, and the district court therefore based its reasoning on a
much more complex analysis under the first definitional prong. This
hurdle added years to Sidney Abbott's suit, and, in the end, the
Supreme Court's opinion has done little to speed future cases raising
similar issues unless they also involve substantial limitations on the
major life activity of reproduction in adults.412
The theory allowing a single negative reaction to qualify a
plaintiff as disabled under the "regarded as" prong has one fatal flaw.
It contradicts the literal language of the statute,413 even though it
appears to coincide with legislative intent. Therefore, it is likely that
the courts will continue to reject this interpretation of the prong
based on the plain language of the ADA and continue on their
unwieldy, often inequitable courses.
IV.

COMING TO TERMS WITH UNWORKABLE STATUTORY

LANGUAGE: How THE ADA's DISABILITY DEFINITION MUST BE
CHANGED

Courts are dismissing valid disability discrimination cases
because plaintiffs often are unable to prove their disabled status in
accordance with the tortured language of the ADA's definition of
412. The Bragdon decision will clearly help infertile adults establish their infertility as
a disability. Its usefulness to those with other impairments, however, is questionable,
given that the decision turns on only one major life activity. Even its application to HIVpositive children, or those with HIV who are past menopause, is questionable. See supra
notes 265-78 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.

1999]

"DISABILITY" UNDER THE ADA

1469

disability.414 These dismissals are inconsistent with the congressional
policy behind the definition. 415 Further, they are inconsistent with the
theories from the disability rights movement that underlie the entire
ADA.416 The most important of these theories is that disability is
socially constructed. 417
Disability stems not from a person's
fulfillment of some objective criteria but instead from actions and
reactions on the part of others. Therefore, a disability discrimination
case should properly focus on the defendant's conduct toward the
plaintiff rather than the plaintiff's "objective" status as a person with
a disability. The ADA recognizes the relativity of disability to some
extent by mandating an individualized inquiry in each case as to the
disability issue.418 However, it still puts the burden on the plaintiff to
prove her status, when the real issue concerns the motives behind the
defendant's actions. In addition, the rigid language that the ADA
uses to describe disabled status undercuts the individualized nature
of any inquiry. It is impossible to measure the "substantiality" of
limitations in "major life activities" when what human beings must
do, and how they must do it, is relative.4 9
Several commentators have noted serious inequities resulting
from courts' handling of the disability issue and have called for a
variety of solutions.42 One proposal involves eliminating "working"
as a major life activity,42 ' because people who may indeed be
substantially limited in their ability to perform discrete tasks are
rarely able to prove broad-based limits in employability, as the ADA
regulations 41 and many courts4'

have required. Another proposal

calls for a broadened interpretation of the words "substantially
limits" when assessing disability under the "regarded as" prong,
particularly when the major life activity at issue is working. 424 Finally,
414. See supra notes 247-52, 255-56, 302-11, 317-23, 327-32, 339-43, 353-55, 367-68, and
380-93 and accompanying text.
415. See supranote 173 and accompanying text.
416. See supranotes 44-46 and accompanying text.
417. See supranotes 18-21 and accompanying text.
418. The ADA says that disability is to be defined "with respect to an individual." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1998) ("The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is [based] ... on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for
particular individuals but not for others .... ").
419. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
420. See infra notes 421-25 and accompanying text.
421. See Locke, supra note 260, at 135-46.
422. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3).
423. See supranotes 315-26 and accompanying text.
424. See Mayerson, supra note 371, at 609-12.
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a third proposal calls for changes in judicial interpretation of the
definition as it applies to a number of discrete issues, including
substantial limitations in working, temporary disabilities, judicial
estoppel in cases in which plaintiffs have pursued disability benefits,
and the status of former employees. 425
Each of these proposals has its limits, however. The first
proposal, which calls for the exclusion of working as a major life
activity, would simply limit the number of ways in which a plaintiff
may attempt to prove the disability element of her prima facie case.
If a plaintiff cannot build an argument upon limitations in working,
she would have to substitute some other major life activity that
already is available. Given the way in which the Bragdon Court
recently has defined the word "major" as used in the ADA, 26 it is
unlikely that courts or agencies will add discrete, lower-level tasks
(such as typing or climbing a ladder) to the list of recognized major
life activities any time soon.
The second proposal also has its problems insofar as it suggests
using a broader interpretation of the "substantially limits" element
when assessing the "regarded as" prong than when assessing the first
"actual disability" prong.4 27 While this proposal does appear to
reflect legislative intent and lead to equitable results, 428 it is
inconsistent with current statutory and regulatory language, which
gives no indication that limitations should be measured differently
under the different prongs of the definition. Finally, the third
proposal, although it similarly may coincide with the broader
purposes of the ADA, arguably does not always coincide with
specific legislative intent and the literal statutory language 429 and
425. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 572-84.
426. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2205 (1998).
427. See Mayerson, supranote 371, at 609-12.

428. See supranotes 394-96 and accompanying text.
429. Arguably, the coverage of temporary disabilities would contravene the express
intent of Congress not to include "a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected
finger" within the scope of the ADA. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating that
"minor, trivial impairments" are not covered). But see Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 475-76
(arguing that this language from the legislative history refers to the severity, and not the
duration, of covered impairments). In addition, the expansion of the notion of being
"substantially limited in working" appears to cut against Congress's specification, under
the first prong, that "a person who is limited in his or her ability to perform only a
particular job, because of circumstances unique to that job site or the materials used, may
not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working." H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3, at 29, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451. Under the third "regarded as" prong,
allowing plaintiffs to qualify as disabled because they have been denied opportunities
based on myths, fears, or stereotypes regarding their impairments would contravene the
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does not necessarily address the problems of those who seek to prove
disability by relying on activities other than working.43 °
Given that the literal language of the ADA's disability definition
does not always reflect Congressional intent and, indeed, often
thwarts the policies underlying the ADA as a whole, changes on a
larger scale than those described in the previous proposals are
necessary to bring the definitional language in line with the Act's real
purposes. The statutory definition, which speaks stiltedly in terms of
substantial limitations on major life activities, is simply unworkable.
Defendants who have denied opportunities to people because of
myths, irrational fears, or stereotypes surrounding mental and
physical impairments can easily slip through the Act's linguistic
loopholes, emerging unscathed after a summary dismissal. It appears
that Congress did not intend such results, despite the language it
employed in the disability definition.43 '
Recommendations that courts ignore the strict statutory
language in favor of implied legislative intent, however, contradict
accepted theories of statutory construction432 and will therefore not
likely meet with judicial approval. Courts finding plain meaning in
the terms "major," "substantially limits," and "such an impairment"
will not reject such meaning in favor of contradictory interpretations
evident in legislative history unless the evidence of such
literal statutory language unless those myths, fears, and stereotypes consisted of mistaken
beliefs that the plaintiff was substantially limited in some major life activity. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(C) (1994) (requiring that a plaintiff be regarded as having an impairment that
limits a major life activity, rather than merely being subjected to ill treatment based on
general misperceptions regarding his or her impairment).
430. A rule holding that exclusion from one job makes one "regarded as substantially
limited in the major life activity of working" would allow plaintiffs who have suffered
occupational discrimination to avoid summary dismissal and get to the heart of their cases.
However, it would do little to help other plaintiffs, who must rely on perceived or actual
limitations in other activities to prove the "disability" element of their prima facie cases.
Because of narrow judicial and regulatory interpretations of the "substantially limits"
element, such plaintiffs face considerable difficulty in keeping their cases alive. See supra
notes 299-361 and accompanying text. In addition, even if Congress intended
"substantial" limits in working under the first definitional prong to mean more than
exclusion from a single job, it is hard to justify a different interpretation under the third
"regarded as" prong when the statutory language itself does not draw such a distinction.
See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
432 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
("[W]here. . . the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)));
see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 543 (1947) ("While courts are no longer confined to the [statutory] language,
they are still confined by it.").
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contradictory interpretations is clear and convincing.433 In the case of

the ADA's disability definition, the legislative history contains
evidence that Congress's intent did not necessarily coincide with the
statutory language it drafted, 434 but this evidence has not been
sufficiently strong to convince the more literalist courts to depart
from perceived plain meaning.4
Richard Posner has theorized that statutory language should be
interpreted as commands from legislatures to courts and that the
proper way to interpret such commands is to ascertain what the
legislature was intending to communicate, even if the communication
itself is garbled.436 He presents an example of an instance in which
the intent behind a command is unintentionally contradicted by the
careless language used to communicate it:
Suppose I ask my secretary to call Z and tell him I must
cancel our lunch date today-I have been called out of town
suddenly. The secretary notices that on my calendar I have
marked lunch with Y, not Z, but it is too late to check back
with me, because I have left the office and cannot be
reached. Is it not plain that the secretary should call Y,
even though there was no semantic or internal ambiguity in
my instruction?437
Unfortunately, in the case of the ADA's disability definition, the
discrepancy between the legislative intent and the language
employed is not nearly so neatly discernible. Therefore, unless the
language of the definition itself is changed, courts will have no reason
to change their literalist applications of the statutory text.
A few key changes to the ADA's statutory definition of
disability are necessary to prevent the current tangled language of the

433. See Ron PairEnters., 489 U.S. at 242 ("The plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' " (emphasis
added) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).
434. See supranotes 335 and 394-96 and accompanying text.
435. For examples of judicial opinions rejecting implied legislative intent in favor of the
narrower statutory language, see Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156,
168 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (stating that there was "no reason to resort to the legislative
history to ascertain Congress's intent" because "the statutory meaning of 'impairment' is
plain and unambiguous"); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex.
1994) (taking account of the effects of insulin in evaluating whether a person with diabetes
was substantially limited, despite legislative intent to the contrary, because the plain
meaning of the word "limits" rendered legislative history and congressional intent
"inapplicable to the analysis").
436. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265-68 (1990).
437. Id. at 268.
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definition from undermining the broader purposes of the ADA.
First, Titles I and II of the ADA must be amended so that they no
longer speak in terms of a specific protected class. 48 That is, rather
than prohibiting discrimination against a "qualified individual with a
disability, ' 3 9 these titles must prohibit discrimination "on the basis of
disability." Such a change would shift the inquiry from the plaintiff's
status to the defendant's motivation and would bring the ADA in
line with other civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion."0
The elimination of the protected class structure, standing alone,
will not allow the ADA to fulfill its purposes, however. Title III of
the ADA is not framed in terms of a protected class of individuals
with disabilities, yet its incorporation of the current statutory
definition of "disability" gives rise to the same problems that
plaintiffs encounter when attempting to prove disabled status under
Titles I and II, as Bragdon amply demonstrates. Therefore, even if it
no longer speaks in terms of a protected class of individuals with
disabilities, the ADA must still define disability in a way that allows
courts to assess whether discrimination on a prohibited basis
occurred. The current definition, which relies on notions of
"substantial limits" on "major life activities," has proved not only
unworkable, but often harmful to the Act's purposes. It should be
replaced with a definition based simply upon mental or physical
impairment. Under such a definition, if a defendant bases a decision
upon a plaintiff's actual mental or physical impairment-or a
plaintiff's record of such an impairment, or a perceived
impairment441-and has no legitimate reason to do so, then the
defendant is liable for disability discrimination.
Such a definition coincides with the reasons behind prohibiting
disability discrimination in the first place.
What makes such
discrimination wrong is its reliance on irrational, unsubstantiated
judgments about mental and physical impairments-judgments that

438. Title III, which governs public accommodations, does not speak in terms of a
protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 12812(a) (1994); supra note 113 (providing the express
language of Title III).
439. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (Title I); id. § 12132 (Title II).
440. See, e.g., id § 2000d (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
and national origin in programs receiving federal assistance); id § 2000e (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin in employment).
441. The "record of" and "regarded as" prongs should be maintained. The "record of"
prong is necessary to guard against discrimination based upon irrational beliefs about past
impairments, and the "regarded as" prong is necessary to guard against discrimination
based upon irrational beliefs regarding perceived impairments.
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deprive qualified people of the opportunity to participate in society.
The wrongness of such discrimination does not depend upon how
severe the impairments are or how the people with the impairments
live their lives when they are not busy being subjected to
discrimination.
Instead, the wrongness stems from the
decisionmakers' stereotyping and the vicious circle of isolation it
causes. 2 Thus, a definition turning simply on impairment, rather
than upon notions of substantial limitations in major life activities,
will coincide with the overall purposes of the ADA in banning this
type of discrimination.
One easily anticipated criticism of such a statutory amendment
concerns charges of over-inclusiveness. Critics will claim that in
failing to require plaintiffs to prove that their impairments
substantially limit their major life activities, the amendment will open
the floodgates to allow people with minor impairments to file claims
of disability discrimination and will subject defendants to prolonged,
baseless litigation. These fears, however, are unfounded for several
reasons. First, the amendment does not open floodgates; instead, it
merely assures that the normal channels of access to justice are as
open to disability discrimination cases as they are to cases concerning
race, sex, national origin, and religious discrimination, in which
plaintiffs need not prove a special status in order to proceed with a
suit." 3 Second, any intention to limit the ADA's protections to the
"truly disabled" is misplaced from the outset because "true
disability" is a myth. Even the current ADA definition, through its
"regarded as" prong, recognizes that disability can be in the eyes of
the beholder. 4 Finally, under the suggested amendment, defendants
will not be subjected to prolonged, baseless suits. Even under the
new impairment-based definition, defendants can still win summary
dismissals if they can show a lack of evidence regarding a plaintiff's
442. The ADA itself, in its Findings and Purposes section, recognizes that "historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and ... such forms
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and
pervasive social problem." Id. § 12101(a)(2). The ADA also notes that "the Nation's
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency." Id. § 12101 (a) (8).
443. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
444. The impairment-based definition more precisely effectuates Congress's
explanation of the intended function of the "regarded as" prong in the ADA: If a person
is disqualified from some opportunity "on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or
mental condition" and the disqualifying entity cannot articulate a legitimate reason for
taking the condition into account, then the person is covered by the ADA and the inquiry
shifts to the issue of discriminatory animus, which can be inferred on these facts. H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453.
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actual, recorded, or perceived impairment, or a lack of evidence

indicating that their actions were based upon such an impairment. In
addition, evidence of a legitimate business or other reason to take the

impairment into account could similarly lead to summary dismissal.
Another criticism of the amendment is that it simply transfers

the messy interpretive step from the "major life activity" and
"substantially limits" elements to the "impairment" element and that
courts will merely begin to use the "impairment" element as a new

way to screen out legitimate cases at the summary judgment stage.
This scenario is unlikely. In the vast majority of ADA cases, the

impairment issue rarely surfaces as a point of contention," 5 thanks
perhaps to a fairly concrete regulatory definition,46 which clearly
coincides with the intent evident in the legislative history. 4 7 When

the issue has surfaced, courts have had few problems applying the
regulatory definition to a given set of facts. 48 While a few specific
conditions, such as addiction to nicotine 449 or obesity, 4 0 might test its
445. D'Agostino comments that "most cases involving challenges to the plaintiff's
status as an individual with a disability under the ADA are not premised on the claim that
the plaintiff's condition does not meet the most basic threshold of qualifying as an
'impairment' within the meaning of the implementing regulation." D'Agostino, supra
note 172, at 2 (analyzing a compilation of 170 cases raising the issue of "disability" under
the ADA).
446. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998). The regulations define physical or mental
impairment as
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.
Id.
447. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333
(articulating a definition of "physical or mental impairment" that is identical to the
regulatory definition).
448. Asymptomatic HIV is one of the few conditions that has provoked prolonged
judicial debate regarding the impairment element. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank
of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 167-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that asymptomatic
HIV is not a disability and noting the lack of guidance from committee reports and the
Supreme Court as to the impairment element). However, after the Supreme Court's
decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202-04 (1998), it seems that the inclusion
of asymptomatic HIV as an impairment for ADA purposes is settled. .
449. See Mark W. Pugsley, Note, Nonsmoking HiringPolicies: Examining the Status of
Smokers Under Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 43 DUKE L.J. 1089,
1104-05 (1994) (implying that addiction to nicotine would be an impairment under the
ADA).
450. Compare Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281,286 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[E]xcept in
special cases where the obesity relates to a physiological disorder, [it] is not a 'physical
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limits, the impairment definition contains much less room for
manipulation than do the notions of "substantial limits" and "major
life activities."
A final, more complex criticism concerns the interaction of the
proposed disability definition and the duty to provide reasonable
accommodation to persons with disabilities. 451 At present, the duty to
accommodate arises when a covered entity knows that a person is
disabled and may therefore need accommodation to perform
effectively. 452 Therefore, one could charge that if the disability
definition is expanded, the duty to provide accommodation is
correspondingly, and perhaps overly, expanded. It is doubtful,
however, that a change in the disability definition will have much
practical effect on the duty to accommodate, as it is presently
articulated. Accommodation is required only when it is necessary to
provide an equal opportunity to a person with a disability; it is not
intended to create a personal advantage.453 In addition, the duty to
accommodate arises only when an impairment limits a person's
opportunities to perform a job or to be eligible for benefits and
privileges on an equal basis with non-disabled people.454 Finally,
accommodation is required only when it is reasonable and does not
impose undue hardship. 455

These limitations on the duty to

accommodate would remain in effect, no matter how disability is
defined. Further, the recommended change to the ADA's disability
definition will expand its coverage to include people with real,
recorded, or perceived impairments that do not necessarily
substantially limit major life activities. If the impairments do not
limit such activities, then they will probably not limit the impaired
individual's ability to perform job functions. To the extent that an
impairment' within the meaning of the [Rehabilitation Act and the ADA]."), with Cook v.
Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that morbid obesity could be an
impairment under the Rehabilitation Act).
In general, an unattractive physical
appearance, when not caused by a real or perceived physiological impairment, will not
qualify as a disability for discrimination purposes. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h)
(" '[I]mpairment' does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color,
left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are
not the result of a physiological disorder."). But see Note, Facial Discrimination:
Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2035, 2035-52 (1987) (arguing for the prohibition of
discrimination based on physical appearance under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
451. Regarding the duty to accommodate, see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying
text.
452. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9.
453. See id.
454. See id.
455. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994).
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impairment imposes no barrier to performance, no accommodation
would be required. Discrimination based on such a non-limiting
impairment, however, would be prohibited under the recommended
amendment to the disability definition.
V. CONCLUSION

The disability rights movement has in large part succeeded in
encouraging Americans to rethink notions of ability and disability,
and the ADA, with its novel requirement of reasonable
accommodation, is evidence of that success. However, the specific
language that the ADA uses to define "disability" has thus far
prevented realization of the statutory goal of broadly prohibiting
disability discrimination so as to allow people with disabilities to
participate fully in society. By framing disability in terms of
substantial limitations on major life activities, the ADA has wrongly
focused on the nature of the victim of alleged discrimination rather
than on the nature of the alleged discrimination itself. In doing so, it
has encouraged courts to screen out many valid cases at the summary
judgment stage.
When courts read the plain meaning of the disability definition
in ways that contradict apparent congressional intent, it is not enough
to encourage courts to change their interpretations. The statutory
language itself must be changed. By amending the ADA's disability
definition to eliminate notions of substantial limitations and major
life activities, Congress could structure a new, impairment-based
definition that would bring this aspect of the statute in line with the
overall purposes of the ADA. Such a definition would lead to more
equitable resolutions of disability discrimination claims because it
would focus the inquiry in such cases on the motives of the
defendant, rather than on the status of the plaintiff.

1478

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

